Second military coup in Burkina Faso increases likelihood of further military takeovers amid growing insecurity

Event

Mutinying soldiers conducted a military coup in Burkina Faso's capital Ouagadougou during the early hours of 30 September, deposing Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba as transitional president of the Patriotic Movement for Safeguarding and Restoration (Mouvement Patriotique pour la Sauvegarde et la Restauration: MPSR). The MPSR had first seized control of the country in a military takeover in January 2022 to oust the democratically elected President Roch Marc Kaboré.

Local media reports on 30 September stated that the gunfire had started at approximately 0400 GMT near Thomas Sankara International Airport Ouagadougou, while state-run Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina (RTB) television had gone off air at 0600 GMT for approximately three hours. No casualties were reported. Soldiers had also reportedly deployed to several unspecified strategic areas of the capital to prevent movement.

In a statement released via Facebook on the same day, Lt Col Damiba called for calm and described the suspected coup attempt as a “confusing situation created by a mood swing of some elements of the national armed forces”. However, in a statement read out on RTB television later that day, military junta spokesperson Captain Kiswendsida Farouk Azaria Sorgho announced that Lt Col Damiba had been “dismissed from his functions as president of the MPSR” and had been replaced by Captain Ibrahim Traoré.

In a second statement, Capt Sorgho claimed that Lt Col Damiba had been ousted due to the deteriorating security situation and accused him of “drifting away from the ideals of the junta”. Meanwhile, in a third statement released that day, the MPSR announced the implementation of measures, including the suspension of the constitution, dissolution of the government, the Transitional Charter and the interim parliament, as well as a curfew and the closure of land and air borders. RTB subsequently announced the reopening of Burkina Faso's air borders on 2 October. On the same day, news magazine Jeune Afrique, citing unnamed sources, reported that Lt Col Damiba had resigned.

Significance

The military takeover in September 2022 marked the second coup within nine months in Burkina Faso. According to the Global Instances of Coups dataset by academics Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne, this coup now places Burkina Faso joint third for most coup activity in Africa since 1950, following Burundi and Sudan. The first military takeover in January 2022 was sparked by discontent among civilians and security forces over the increasing insecurity in Burkina Faso. Similarly, as outlined by the MPSR, the 30 September coup was driven by the deteriorating security situation, highlighting the increasing threat posed by Islamic State and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) militants.

At the time of the January coup, Janes assessed that militant attacks would increase in the short-to-medium term, particularly amid political instability and a demonstrated lack of security force capability to tackle militancy.

The coup underlines the deterioration of French influence in Burkina Faso and Russia's growing presence within the region. According to Franceinfo: Afrique, Russian flags were seen during pro-military demonstrations as people celebrated the military takeover on 30 September. Meanwhile, multiple media outlets detailed attacks on symbols of French influence across Ouagadougou, including a fire lit by protesters on the outer perimeter of the French Embassy. This response reflects a broader regional trend of Russian sympathy and French hostility since the breakdown of Franco-Malian relations following Mali's August 2020 coup. According to multiple media outlets, Russian flags and anti-French sentiment were also visible during Mali's pro-coup celebrations in May 2021 and other pro-military celebrations thereafter.

Between 2015 and 2021, Janes data recorded significant upticks in violence by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Burkina Faso, driven by the porosity of the tri-border area with neighbouring Niger and Mali, where the violence has been predominantly concentrated. In 2022, Burkina Faso became the epicentre of violence in the tri-border area, surpassing Mali in the number of militant attacks (+36.4% more than Mali) and resultant non-militant fatalities (+16.7% more than Mali), owing to a lack of security force capability and the drawdown of the French military's regional operation ‘Barkhane' in early 2022. The increasing level of militancy in Burkina Faso has also led to a spillover of violence in coastal West African countries since 2018, such as Benin, Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo, which will likely continue amid ongoing political instability.

Civilian opposition to Lt Col Damiba likely provided a further catalyst for the 30 September military coup. On 29 September, hundreds of residents protested in Bobo-Dioulasso city in western Houet province in Hauts-Bassins region, to demand Lt Col Damiba's resignation over his failure to tackle the ongoing insecurity in Burkina Faso, according to local media reports. The protests likely indicated to Capt Traore and his forces that civil resistance to a military coup in the short term would be limited, fuelling their decision to intervene militarily.

Previously, in a press conference on 17 September, the co-ordinator of the Patriotic Front (Front Patriotique) – a coalition of 33 political parties and civil society organisations opposed to the previous military junta – Germain Nama had called for the removal of the ruling military junta. He stated that “Political management of the terrorism crisis, made of state lies, manipulation, racketeering and corruption, is characterised by the absence of a political strategy.”

Outlook

The military coup on 30 September 2022 significantly increased the likelihood of further military takeovers over the long term as the precedent for military intervention has strengthened in Burkina Faso alongside political instability. However, coup risk in Burkina Faso will peak over the immediate-to-short term. Several African countries, including Burundi in 2001, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2004, Mali in 2012, and Sudan in 2021, all experienced a military coup within 100 days of a previous coup as the volatile security environment creates the conditions necessary for further coup plots.

As such, those loyal to Lt Col Damiba or new factions within the MPSR may seek to capitalise on the current insecurity with a counter-coup. Evidence of insubordination or reports of infighting within the military would challenge Traoré's leadership and increase the risk of an attempted counter-coup and outbreak of violence within the military and among civilians. Moreover, the comparatively junior ranks of the coup leaders – from Lieutenant Colonel to Captain – indicate that discontent is permeating increasingly further down the chain of command where low morale is already an ongoing issue.

The 30 September coup likely presents an opportunity for further Russian influence in Burkina Faso. In the statement read out on RTB, the new military regime stated its willingness to “go to other partners ready to help in the fight against terrorism” which was likely a reference to mercenaries from the Wagner Group, a Russian private military contractor, operating in neighbouring Mali where there has been growing anti-West sentiment within the country's transitional government. In a statement posted on Telegram, Wagner founder and a close Putin ally Yevgeny Prigozhin offered his congratulations to the new leader, stating “I salute and support Captain Ibrahim Traoré.”

The ability of the new military junta to tackle the rising militant attacks will determine the level of political stability in Burkina Faso over the medium-to-long term. Janes continues to assess that militant violence is highly likely to increase in the next 12-month period, affecting the morale of security forces and the civilian population as well as the perceived credibility of the military government. In turn, this will heighten the risk of further military coups as demonstrated in neighbouring Mali which suffered two military takeovers in August 2020 and May 2021, delaying the transition to civilian rule.

(Note: Items from news/wire services are abstracted from the originals and are not verbatim)