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Feature: China sets sights on modernisation targets

Date Posted: 17-Jan-2025
Author: 
Jon Grevatt, Bangkok Ridzwan Rahmat, Singapore Akhil Kadidal, Bangalore Oishee Majumdar, Bangalore Sohini Mandal, Bangalore

Key points

  • Developments over the past 18 months suggest that the PLA is accelerating modernisation, with an aim to strengthen joint missions and operations at distance from China
  • However, Beijing continues to face challenges in meeting its ambitious military targets over the coming decade and beyond


As China gets closer to the 100th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 2027, several military capability themes have emerged as priorities for Beijing. Chief among those themes appears to be those that enable the PLA to be more effective in joint operations and at longer distances.

The emphasis that Beijing places on enhancing the interoperability of the PLA was highlighted in 2024 by two high-profile and symbolic joint exercises that it conducted around Taiwan, which along with the ability to defend China's perceived interests across the Pacific frame the scope of Chinese military modernisation.

Exercise ‘Joint Sword-2024A' was conducted by the PLA's Eastern Theater Command (ETC) in May and ‘Joint Sword-2024B' took place in October. These drills followed other joint exercises that were held by the PLA in and around Taiwan in August 2022 and April 2023, with the latter named by China as the original ‘Joint Sword' exercise. The nomenclature of recent drills clearly suggests that they will become a regular event around Taiwan.

The two exercises held in 2024 were not as large as the original ‘Joint Sword' in 2023, but they did provide the PLA with an opportunity to practise joint operations as well as the encirclement and blockade scenarios that will undoubtedly form a key part of any future Chinese invasion of the island.

The exercises in 2024 also gave the PLA an opportunity to operationalise several emerging capabilities and technologies intended to deepen military interoperability as the PLA reaches its 100th anniversary and then continues towards its next major milestones in 2035, when Beijing aims to have “completed” military modernisation, and in 2049 (China's centenary), when Beijing's aim is to have developed a “world-class military”.

The two near-term goals are aligned with China's aims to develop capabilities to effectively counter the US military in Taiwan and the wider Indo-Pacific, whereas the mid-century target is clearly aimed at supporting China's rise as a global power.

China military expenditureJanes Defence Budgets forecasts that China's military expenditure will reach nearly USD360 billion by 2030. (Janes)

Capability themes

Capabilities China is prioritising to enhance interoperability include surveillance, command-and-control (C2), and information dominance systems, supported by a newly restructured information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) PLA backbone.

In 2024, for instance, China demonstrated the rapid pace of its space-based and conventional radar technology development, with the aim to deepen persistent and over-the-horizon situational awareness. The long-range and anti-stealth nature of many new Chinese radars – for instance, the YLC-2E multifunction radar and the 780 target designator radar – is core to the PLA's intention to develop capability to execute an early strike on any adversary.

Other areas of jointness will be bolstered by the PLA restructure announced in April 2024 in which the Strategic Support Force (SSF) was dissolved and replaced by several service arms, including the new Information Support Force (ISF).

Recent PLA land forces development is similarly aimed at enhancing combined arms operations and increasing long-range fires capability. For example, in 2024 China expanded deployment of its PHL-16 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), which can fire China's new Fire Dragon 480 cruise missiles, and unveiled its new 3,000 km-range Hong Qi-19 (HQ-19) surface-to-air (SAM) system. China also pointed to an improving strategic missile capability with the first test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in several decades.

China's focus on both Taiwan and defending longer-range interests was also evident in the maritime domain. The PLA Navy's (PLAN's) new Type 076 amphibious assault ship – launched in December 2024 – is aimed at enhancing capability to carry out force projection operations, including those across the Taiwan Strait. The type will have a similar role to the PLAN's Type 075 assault ships, the fourth of which is expected to be commissioned in 2025.

CASC Cai Hong 7In 2024 the operational concept of CASC's Cai Hong 7 (CH-7) UAV evolved from a strategic armed reconnaissance platform to a tactical stealth surveillance aircraft. (Janes/Sam Wise)

At longer distances, the PLAN's new aircraft carrier Fujian , which was launched in May 2024, is the country's first configured for catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) aircraft operations and will make the platform a potent capability across a region it refers to as the first island chain, which roughly refers to the islands of Japan and Taiwan and parts of the Philippines and Indonesia.

In the air domain, power projection capability will be strengthened by China's recent progress in developing aero-engines, particularly the high-bypass-ratio Shenyang/Xian WS20. In late 2024 this engine was visible on new Xian Y-20B transport aircraft, and, looking forward, the WS20 will enable the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) to induct larger numbers of platforms, including transport aircraft and aerial refuellers.

Another notable area of development in China's air domain in 2024 was its rapidly expanding unmanned system assets, which are helping to boost a range of PLA capabilities, including combat, ISR, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).

Norinco displayed its VT5-U light tank at Airshow China 2024Norinco displayed its VT5-U light tank at Airshow China 2024. The tank, which is not thought to be operational, retains the baseline VT5 design, but the unmanned version is fitted with several cameras on the front and rear of its hull and one on its turret. (Janes/Sam Wise)

The focus of China's recent land-based military modernisation has been aimed at strengthening the PLA's combined arms operations through the induction of new armour and artillery capability. Another priority has been to expand China's strategic short-, mid-, and long-range fires capability in an effort intended to shift the paradigm against adversaries, particularly the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.

Looking forward, the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) will need to continue its focus on replacing many existing ageing assets with modern counterparts. This effort is aligned with the PLAGF's long-standing transition from a motorised to a mechanised force. Key capability themes in this modernisation process will include enabling more enhanced combined arms operations, enhancing the effectiveness of combat capability through the introduction of advanced technologies such as reconnaissance and signals, and improving long-range fires capability to ensure China's land forces can pose a threat to US allies, assets, and interests in the Indo-Pacific.

This equipment modernisation process is proceeding in tandem with a focus on improving PLA training. In late 2024, for instance, the PLA introduced what state media described as a “new approach” to military training intended to enhance combined arms operations. The new model includes a live and synthetic training mix and is aimed at enhancing unit integration, tactical co-ordination, and combat readiness.

Artillery and armour

Indicating a requirement to deploy lightweight, mobile artillery fire assets along China's borders, the PLAGF's Southern Theater Command (STC) started to deploy in late 2023 its new truck-mounted 122 mm PCL-161 self-propelled howitzer in the Aksai Chin region near India. Janes data shows the PCL-161, which has a range of between 22 and 30 km, depending on the type of ammunition, is now operated by four of five of the PLA's theatre commands.

The PCL-161 is deployed from a 6×6 platform based on a modified Dongfeng Mengshi 6×6 CTL181A armoured vehicle. The vehicle is equipped with a digital fire-control system (FCS), interfaced with a multifunctional display located just forward of the rear-left wheel. The howitzer's 122 mm gun features a multibaffle muzzle brake and a traverse of around 25° left and right, with a maximum elevation of about 70°.

PHL-16 was displayed at the Airshow China 2024The PHL-16 was displayed at the Airshow China 2024 event in Zhuhai alongside a model of the Fire Dragon 280A ballistic missile. (Janes/Sam Wise)

Longer-range fires capability has been strengthened by the expanding deployment of the PHL-16 MLRS, otherwise known as PCH-191 or the AR-3. CCTV footage in 2023 confirmed the deployment of at least two PHL-16 systems in the PLAGF's 73rd Group Army in the ETC, and deployment of the type across other theatres is likely to have expanded since.

The PHL-16 is based on a modified Wanshan WS2400 8×8 vehicle chassis. The PHL-16's armament system is capable of either a 10 round that can fire 300 mm rockets with a range of 130 km or an eight round that can fire 370 mm rockets with a maximum range of 280 km. The system can also fire two 750 mm Fire Dragon 280A tactical missiles with a maximum range of 290 km. According to the state-owned Global Times, the PHL-16 can also switch to TL-7B anti-ship missiles and 750 mm Fire Dragon 480 tactical ballistic missiles.

China has also recently introduced a new 8×8 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). Images of the Type 19 IFV (also designated as Type 22) emerged in a broadcast by the state-owned China Central Television (CCTV) in November 2023. Footage showed an unknown number of the type being inducted into the 145th Medium Combined Arms Brigade of the 73rd Group Army under the ETC. The Type 19 appears armed with a 30 mm cannon and a co-axial machine gun (MG), as well as a launcher for four anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) mounted on the turret's rear right.

The specifications of the vehicle have not been disclosed, but they seem to be based on the ZBL-09 chassis, which is already in service with the PLAGF. The amphibious-capable Type 19's hull features a redesigned suspension and automotive components to support a higher gross vehicle weight (GVW) than the ZBL-09. This higher GVW allows the vehicle to carry a greater payload, possibly enabling improved armour protection and heavier mission systems deployed on the platform. Its weight is an estimated 35 tonnes, compared with the ZBL-09, which weighs 21 tonnes.

19 IFV features a hull identical to the ZBL-09 IFV

The Type 19 IFV features a hull identical to the ZBL-09 IFV (pictured above) in service with the PLA and a new turret. (Russian MoD)

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