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Putin's mobilisation announcement signals readiness to escalate Ukraine conflict, while Penal Code amendments indicate Kremlin's alarm over lack of popular support

On 21 September 2022 President Vladimir Putin announced in a pre-recorded televised address a partial mobilisation of the Russian Federation for the first time since the Second World War. Putin said that the goal of the so-called ‘special operation' – the liberation of the Donbas – remains unchanged. Putin also warned the West that in the case of a threat to Russia's “territorial integrity”, he is ready to use all the means at his disposal to protect Russia, including nuclear capabilities.

In a subsequent speech Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu said that the country is fighting not Ukraine, but the “collective West”. Shoigu added that there are around 25 million Russians who fit the criteria of military reservists, but only around 1% of Russia's “mobilisation potential” will be used, with 300,000 reservists being called up.

Prior to Putin's speech, the Russian State Duma (parliament) amended the Russian Federation's Criminal Code on 20 September, adding new penalties for “crimes against military service”, including voluntary surrender, looting, and “crimes against state power”. A soldier who surrenders, will face between three and 15 years in prison.

Significance

An undeclared, ‘hybrid' mobilisation was also ongoing in Russia since the beginning of the war in which an unknown number of employees of some defence-related companies have been called up for ‘training' in Ukraine, inmates from penal colonies were promised amnesty if they participated in the ‘special military operation', and men of conscription age were contacted and invited to sign a contract to join the military. On 15 September Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov encouraged the governors of Russian regions to “self-mobilise”, to provide at least 1,000 volunteers from each of Russia's 85 federal subjects. However, the measures of secretive, hybrid, and regional mobilisations has not fulfilled Moscow's need for manpower.

Following Putin's speech an official decree on mobilisation was released by the Kremlin. Janes analysis of the decree found that despite the Russian president declaring only a ‘partial' mobilisation, the legislative act does not define the meaning of ‘partial', neither in terms of territories, duration of contract, or categories of citizens to be deployed. The decree does not clarify the duration of the contracts of the reserves, stating that it would last “until the end of the partial mobilisation period”. It is also not restricted to reservists, stating that Russian citizens can be called up, with exceptions only in some categories, based on health condition, age, or employment within the military-industrial complex.

The lack of exact definitions of what a ‘partial' mobilisation means in the decree signals a likely intention to leave a legislative gap for a de-facto ‘full-scale' mobilisation. It is very likely that the mobilisation will gradually expand, as the exact number of citizens affected by the mobilisation was not defined in the decree, therefor would be subject to change. The decision to introduce the mobilisation cautiously is due to the Kremlin's fears of public discontent.

Outlook

The Kremlin's announcement is likely to have an impact on different levels.

  • International: referendums in the occupied territories

Moscow is planning to conduct “referendums” in Russian-occupied territories between 23 and 27 September, which are almost certainly to be used as a prelude to annexation and will very likely lead to an escalation of the war.The referendums will allow Moscow to claim a part of Ukraine's territory as an integral part of Russia, meaning that in case of an armed attack, the Kremlin will have a “justification” to use “any means” to defend the newly annexed territories.

  • Domestic: unrest

Anti-war movement “Vesna” has called for nationwide protests in Russia. The protests are likely to take place across the country on 21 September at 1900 Moscow time. The protests in Russia are likely to be widespread across the country, with the biggest protests taking place in Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg. It is very likely that hundreds of people will be detained following the protests.

  • Domestic: Russians fleeing the country

At the time of writing the Kremlin did not release details about restrictions on those subject to mobilisation looking to leave the country. The Kremlin's Press Secretary, Dmitry Peskov, said that clarifications on the possible closure of the borders for those categories will be soon released. Neighbouring Latvia declared on 21 September that it will not provide humanitarian visas to Russians, trying to escape mobilisation.It is very likely thousands of Russians, especially men of conscription age will try to leave Russia in the following days. According to Russian-speaking Telegram channels, all direct tickets to visa-free countries, such as Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan were sold out for the “nearest” dates.

  • Domestic: poor morale of troops.

The changes to legislation prior to announcement of the mobilisation indicate the Kremlin's fear of low morale among future conscripts. It is likely that demotivated soldiers will have an impact on the effectiveness of the mobilisation, as well as Russian forces' combat capability.

https://www.janes.com/defence-news/putin's-mobilisation-announcement-signals-readiness-to-escalate-ukraine-conflict-while-penal-code-amendments-indicate-kremlin's-alarm-over-lack-of-popular-support/

Putin's mobilisation announcement signals readiness to escalate Ukraine conflict, while Penal Code a...

Putin's mobilisation announcement signals readiness to escalate Ukraine conflict, while Penal Code amendments indicate Kremlin's alarm over lack of popular support

On 21 September 2022 President Vladimir Putin announced in a pre-recorded televised address a partial mobilisation of the Russian Federation for the first time since the Second World War. Putin said that the goal of the so-called ‘special operation' – the liberation of the Donbas – remains unchanged. Putin also warned the West that in the case of a threat to Russia's “territorial integrity”, he is ready to use all the means at his disposal to protect Russia, including nuclear capabilities.

In a subsequent speech Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu said that the country is fighting not Ukraine, but the “collective West”. Shoigu added that there are around 25 million Russians who fit the criteria of military reservists, but only around 1% of Russia's “mobilisation potential” will be used, with 300,000 reservists being called up.

Prior to Putin's speech, the Russian State Duma (parliament) amended the Russian Federation's Criminal Code on 20 September, adding new penalties for “crimes against military service”, including voluntary surrender, looting, and “crimes against state power”. A soldier who surrenders, will face between three and 15 years in prison.

Significance

An undeclared, ‘hybrid' mobilisation was also ongoing in Russia since the beginning of the war in which an unknown number of employees of some defence-related companies have been called up for ‘training' in Ukraine, inmates from penal colonies were promised amnesty if they participated in the ‘special military operation', and men of conscription age were contacted and invited to sign a contract to join the military. On 15 September Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov encouraged the governors of Russian regions to “self-mobilise”, to provide at least 1,000 volunteers from each of Russia's 85 federal subjects. However, the measures of secretive, hybrid, and regional mobilisations has not fulfilled Moscow's need for manpower.

Following Putin's speech an official decree on mobilisation was released by the Kremlin. Janes analysis of the decree found that despite the Russian president declaring only a ‘partial' mobilisation, the legislative act does not define the meaning of ‘partial', neither in terms of territories, duration of contract, or categories of citizens to be deployed. The decree does not clarify the duration of the contracts of the reserves, stating that it would last “until the end of the partial mobilisation period”. It is also not restricted to reservists, stating that Russian citizens can be called up, with exceptions only in some categories, based on health condition, age, or employment within the military-industrial complex.

The lack of exact definitions of what a ‘partial' mobilisation means in the decree signals a likely intention to leave a legislative gap for a de-facto ‘full-scale' mobilisation. It is very likely that the mobilisation will gradually expand, as the exact number of citizens affected by the mobilisation was not defined in the decree, therefor would be subject to change. The decision to introduce the mobilisation cautiously is due to the Kremlin's fears of public discontent.

Outlook

The Kremlin's announcement is likely to have an impact on different levels.

  • International: referendums in the occupied territories

Moscow is planning to conduct “referendums” in Russian-occupied territories between 23 and 27 September, which are almost certainly to be used as a prelude to annexation and will very likely lead to an escalation of the war.The referendums will allow Moscow to claim a part of Ukraine's territory as an integral part of Russia, meaning that in case of an armed attack, the Kremlin will have a “justification” to use “any means” to defend the newly annexed territories.

  • Domestic: unrest

Anti-war movement “Vesna” has called for nationwide protests in Russia. The protests are likely to take place across the country on 21 September at 1900 Moscow time. The protests in Russia are likely to be widespread across the country, with the biggest protests taking place in Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg. It is very likely that hundreds of people will be detained following the protests.

  • Domestic: Russians fleeing the country

At the time of writing the Kremlin did not release details about restrictions on those subject to mobilisation looking to leave the country. The Kremlin's Press Secretary, Dmitry Peskov, said that clarifications on the possible closure of the borders for those categories will be soon released. Neighbouring Latvia declared on 21 September that it will not provide humanitarian visas to Russians, trying to escape mobilisation.It is very likely thousands of Russians, especially men of conscription age will try to leave Russia in the following days. According to Russian-speaking Telegram channels, all direct tickets to visa-free countries, such as Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan were sold out for the “nearest” dates.

  • Domestic: poor morale of troops.

The changes to legislation prior to announcement of the mobilisation indicate the Kremlin's fear of low morale among future conscripts. It is likely that demotivated soldiers will have an impact on the effectiveness of the mobilisation, as well as Russian forces' combat capability.

https://www.janes.com/defence-news/putin's-mobilisation-announcement-signals-readiness-to-escalate-ukraine-conflict-while-penal-code-amendments-indicate-kremlin's-alarm-over-lack-of-popular-support/

Putin's mobilisation announcement signals readiness to escalate Ukraine conflict, while Penal Code a...

Putin's mobilisation announcement signals readiness to escalate Ukraine conflict, while Penal Code amendments indicate Kremlin's alarm over lack of popular support

On 21 September 2022 President Vladimir Putin announced in a pre-recorded televised address a partial mobilisation of the Russian Federation for the first time since the Second World War. Putin said that the goal of the so-called ‘special operation' – the liberation of the Donbas – remains unchanged. Putin also warned the West that in the case of a threat to Russia's “territorial integrity”, he is ready to use all the means at his disposal to protect Russia, including nuclear capabilities.

In a subsequent speech Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu said that the country is fighting not Ukraine, but the “collective West”. Shoigu added that there are around 25 million Russians who fit the criteria of military reservists, but only around 1% of Russia's “mobilisation potential” will be used, with 300,000 reservists being called up.

Prior to Putin's speech, the Russian State Duma (parliament) amended the Russian Federation's Criminal Code on 20 September, adding new penalties for “crimes against military service”, including voluntary surrender, looting, and “crimes against state power”. A soldier who surrenders, will face between three and 15 years in prison.

Significance

An undeclared, ‘hybrid' mobilisation was also ongoing in Russia since the beginning of the war in which an unknown number of employees of some defence-related companies have been called up for ‘training' in Ukraine, inmates from penal colonies were promised amnesty if they participated in the ‘special military operation', and men of conscription age were contacted and invited to sign a contract to join the military. On 15 September Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov encouraged the governors of Russian regions to “self-mobilise”, to provide at least 1,000 volunteers from each of Russia's 85 federal subjects. However, the measures of secretive, hybrid, and regional mobilisations has not fulfilled Moscow's need for manpower.

Following Putin's speech an official decree on mobilisation was released by the Kremlin. Janes analysis of the decree found that despite the Russian president declaring only a ‘partial' mobilisation, the legislative act does not define the meaning of ‘partial', neither in terms of territories, duration of contract, or categories of citizens to be deployed. The decree does not clarify the duration of the contracts of the reserves, stating that it would last “until the end of the partial mobilisation period”. It is also not restricted to reservists, stating that Russian citizens can be called up, with exceptions only in some categories, based on health condition, age, or employment within the military-industrial complex.

The lack of exact definitions of what a ‘partial' mobilisation means in the decree signals a likely intention to leave a legislative gap for a de-facto ‘full-scale' mobilisation. It is very likely that the mobilisation will gradually expand, as the exact number of citizens affected by the mobilisation was not defined in the decree, therefor would be subject to change. The decision to introduce the mobilisation cautiously is due to the Kremlin's fears of public discontent.

Outlook

The Kremlin's announcement is likely to have an impact on different levels.

  • International: referendums in the occupied territories

Moscow is planning to conduct “referendums” in Russian-occupied territories between 23 and 27 September, which are almost certainly to be used as a prelude to annexation and will very likely lead to an escalation of the war.The referendums will allow Moscow to claim a part of Ukraine's territory as an integral part of Russia, meaning that in case of an armed attack, the Kremlin will have a “justification” to use “any means” to defend the newly annexed territories.

  • Domestic: unrest

Anti-war movement “Vesna” has called for nationwide protests in Russia. The protests are likely to take place across the country on 21 September at 1900 Moscow time. The protests in Russia are likely to be widespread across the country, with the biggest protests taking place in Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg. It is very likely that hundreds of people will be detained following the protests.

  • Domestic: Russians fleeing the country

At the time of writing the Kremlin did not release details about restrictions on those subject to mobilisation looking to leave the country. The Kremlin's Press Secretary, Dmitry Peskov, said that clarifications on the possible closure of the borders for those categories will be soon released. Neighbouring Latvia declared on 21 September that it will not provide humanitarian visas to Russians, trying to escape mobilisation.It is very likely thousands of Russians, especially men of conscription age will try to leave Russia in the following days. According to Russian-speaking Telegram channels, all direct tickets to visa-free countries, such as Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan were sold out for the “nearest” dates.

  • Domestic: poor morale of troops.

The changes to legislation prior to announcement of the mobilisation indicate the Kremlin's fear of low morale among future conscripts. It is likely that demotivated soldiers will have an impact on the effectiveness of the mobilisation, as well as Russian forces' combat capability.

https://www.janes.com/defence-news/putin's-mobilisation-announcement-signals-readiness-to-escalate-ukraine-conflict-while-penal-code-amendments-indicate-kremlin's-alarm-over-lack-of-popular-support/

Putin's mobilisation announcement signals readiness to escalate Ukraine conflict, while Penal Code a...

Putin's mobilisation announcement signals readiness to escalate Ukraine conflict, while Penal Code amendments indicate Kremlin's alarm over lack of popular support

On 21 September 2022 President Vladimir Putin announced in a pre-recorded televised address a partial mobilisation of the Russian Federation for the first time since the Second World War. Putin said that the goal of the so-called ‘special operation' – the liberation of the Donbas – remains unchanged. Putin also warned the West that in the case of a threat to Russia's “territorial integrity”, he is ready to use all the means at his disposal to protect Russia, including nuclear capabilities.

In a subsequent speech Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu said that the country is fighting not Ukraine, but the “collective West”. Shoigu added that there are around 25 million Russians who fit the criteria of military reservists, but only around 1% of Russia's “mobilisation potential” will be used, with 300,000 reservists being called up.

Prior to Putin's speech, the Russian State Duma (parliament) amended the Russian Federation's Criminal Code on 20 September, adding new penalties for “crimes against military service”, including voluntary surrender, looting, and “crimes against state power”. A soldier who surrenders, will face between three and 15 years in prison.

Significance

An undeclared, ‘hybrid' mobilisation was also ongoing in Russia since the beginning of the war in which an unknown number of employees of some defence-related companies have been called up for ‘training' in Ukraine, inmates from penal colonies were promised amnesty if they participated in the ‘special military operation', and men of conscription age were contacted and invited to sign a contract to join the military. On 15 September Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov encouraged the governors of Russian regions to “self-mobilise”, to provide at least 1,000 volunteers from each of Russia's 85 federal subjects. However, the measures of secretive, hybrid, and regional mobilisations has not fulfilled Moscow's need for manpower.

Following Putin's speech an official decree on mobilisation was released by the Kremlin. Janes analysis of the decree found that despite the Russian president declaring only a ‘partial' mobilisation, the legislative act does not define the meaning of ‘partial', neither in terms of territories, duration of contract, or categories of citizens to be deployed. The decree does not clarify the duration of the contracts of the reserves, stating that it would last “until the end of the partial mobilisation period”. It is also not restricted to reservists, stating that Russian citizens can be called up, with exceptions only in some categories, based on health condition, age, or employment within the military-industrial complex.

The lack of exact definitions of what a ‘partial' mobilisation means in the decree signals a likely intention to leave a legislative gap for a de-facto ‘full-scale' mobilisation. It is very likely that the mobilisation will gradually expand, as the exact number of citizens affected by the mobilisation was not defined in the decree, therefor would be subject to change. The decision to introduce the mobilisation cautiously is due to the Kremlin's fears of public discontent.

Outlook

The Kremlin's announcement is likely to have an impact on different levels.

  • International: referendums in the occupied territories

Moscow is planning to conduct “referendums” in Russian-occupied territories between 23 and 27 September, which are almost certainly to be used as a prelude to annexation and will very likely lead to an escalation of the war.The referendums will allow Moscow to claim a part of Ukraine's territory as an integral part of Russia, meaning that in case of an armed attack, the Kremlin will have a “justification” to use “any means” to defend the newly annexed territories.

  • Domestic: unrest

Anti-war movement “Vesna” has called for nationwide protests in Russia. The protests are likely to take place across the country on 21 September at 1900 Moscow time. The protests in Russia are likely to be widespread across the country, with the biggest protests taking place in Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg. It is very likely that hundreds of people will be detained following the protests.

  • Domestic: Russians fleeing the country

At the time of writing the Kremlin did not release details about restrictions on those subject to mobilisation looking to leave the country. The Kremlin's Press Secretary, Dmitry Peskov, said that clarifications on the possible closure of the borders for those categories will be soon released. Neighbouring Latvia declared on 21 September that it will not provide humanitarian visas to Russians, trying to escape mobilisation.It is very likely thousands of Russians, especially men of conscription age will try to leave Russia in the following days. According to Russian-speaking Telegram channels, all direct tickets to visa-free countries, such as Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan were sold out for the “nearest” dates.

  • Domestic: poor morale of troops.

The changes to legislation prior to announcement of the mobilisation indicate the Kremlin's fear of low morale among future conscripts. It is likely that demotivated soldiers will have an impact on the effectiveness of the mobilisation, as well as Russian forces' combat capability.

https://www.janes.com/defence-news/putin's-mobilisation-announcement-signals-readiness-to-escalate-ukraine-conflict-while-penal-code-amendments-indicate-kremlin's-alarm-over-lack-of-popular-support/

Putin's mobilisation announcement signals readiness to escalate Ukraine conflict, while Penal Code a...

Putin's mobilisation announcement signals readiness to escalate Ukraine conflict, while Penal Code amendments indicate Kremlin's alarm over lack of popular support

On 21 September 2022 President Vladimir Putin announced in a pre-recorded televised address a partial mobilisation of the Russian Federation for the first time since the Second World War. Putin said that the goal of the so-called ‘special operation' – the liberation of the Donbas – remains unchanged. Putin also warned the West that in the case of a threat to Russia's “territorial integrity”, he is ready to use all the means at his disposal to protect Russia, including nuclear capabilities.

In a subsequent speech Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu said that the country is fighting not Ukraine, but the “collective West”. Shoigu added that there are around 25 million Russians who fit the criteria of military reservists, but only around 1% of Russia's “mobilisation potential” will be used, with 300,000 reservists being called up.

Prior to Putin's speech, the Russian State Duma (parliament) amended the Russian Federation's Criminal Code on 20 September, adding new penalties for “crimes against military service”, including voluntary surrender, looting, and “crimes against state power”. A soldier who surrenders, will face between three and 15 years in prison.

Significance

An undeclared, ‘hybrid' mobilisation was also ongoing in Russia since the beginning of the war in which an unknown number of employees of some defence-related companies have been called up for ‘training' in Ukraine, inmates from penal colonies were promised amnesty if they participated in the ‘special military operation', and men of conscription age were contacted and invited to sign a contract to join the military. On 15 September Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov encouraged the governors of Russian regions to “self-mobilise”, to provide at least 1,000 volunteers from each of Russia's 85 federal subjects. However, the measures of secretive, hybrid, and regional mobilisations has not fulfilled Moscow's need for manpower.

Following Putin's speech an official decree on mobilisation was released by the Kremlin. Janes analysis of the decree found that despite the Russian president declaring only a ‘partial' mobilisation, the legislative act does not define the meaning of ‘partial', neither in terms of territories, duration of contract, or categories of citizens to be deployed. The decree does not clarify the duration of the contracts of the reserves, stating that it would last “until the end of the partial mobilisation period”. It is also not restricted to reservists, stating that Russian citizens can be called up, with exceptions only in some categories, based on health condition, age, or employment within the military-industrial complex.

The lack of exact definitions of what a ‘partial' mobilisation means in the decree signals a likely intention to leave a legislative gap for a de-facto ‘full-scale' mobilisation. It is very likely that the mobilisation will gradually expand, as the exact number of citizens affected by the mobilisation was not defined in the decree, therefor would be subject to change. The decision to introduce the mobilisation cautiously is due to the Kremlin's fears of public discontent.

Outlook

The Kremlin's announcement is likely to have an impact on different levels.

  • International: referendums in the occupied territories

Moscow is planning to conduct “referendums” in Russian-occupied territories between 23 and 27 September, which are almost certainly to be used as a prelude to annexation and will very likely lead to an escalation of the war.The referendums will allow Moscow to claim a part of Ukraine's territory as an integral part of Russia, meaning that in case of an armed attack, the Kremlin will have a “justification” to use “any means” to defend the newly annexed territories.

  • Domestic: unrest

Anti-war movement “Vesna” has called for nationwide protests in Russia. The protests are likely to take place across the country on 21 September at 1900 Moscow time. The protests in Russia are likely to be widespread across the country, with the biggest protests taking place in Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg. It is very likely that hundreds of people will be detained following the protests.

  • Domestic: Russians fleeing the country

At the time of writing the Kremlin did not release details about restrictions on those subject to mobilisation looking to leave the country. The Kremlin's Press Secretary, Dmitry Peskov, said that clarifications on the possible closure of the borders for those categories will be soon released. Neighbouring Latvia declared on 21 September that it will not provide humanitarian visas to Russians, trying to escape mobilisation.It is very likely thousands of Russians, especially men of conscription age will try to leave Russia in the following days. According to Russian-speaking Telegram channels, all direct tickets to visa-free countries, such as Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan were sold out for the “nearest” dates.

  • Domestic: poor morale of troops.

The changes to legislation prior to announcement of the mobilisation indicate the Kremlin's fear of low morale among future conscripts. It is likely that demotivated soldiers will have an impact on the effectiveness of the mobilisation, as well as Russian forces' combat capability.

https://www.janes.com/defence-news/putin's-mobilisation-announcement-signals-readiness-to-escalate-ukraine-conflict-while-penal-code-amendments-indicate-kremlin's-alarm-over-lack-of-popular-support/

Putin's mobilisation announcement signals readiness to escalate Ukraine conflict, while Penal Code a...

Putin's mobilisation announcement signals readiness to escalate Ukraine conflict, while Penal Code amendments indicate Kremlin's alarm over lack of popular support

On 21 September 2022 President Vladimir Putin announced in a pre-recorded televised address a partial mobilisation of the Russian Federation for the first time since the Second World War. Putin said that the goal of the so-called ‘special operation' – the liberation of the Donbas – remains unchanged. Putin also warned the West that in the case of a threat to Russia's “territorial integrity”, he is ready to use all the means at his disposal to protect Russia, including nuclear capabilities.

In a subsequent speech Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu said that the country is fighting not Ukraine, but the “collective West”. Shoigu added that there are around 25 million Russians who fit the criteria of military reservists, but only around 1% of Russia's “mobilisation potential” will be used, with 300,000 reservists being called up.

Prior to Putin's speech, the Russian State Duma (parliament) amended the Russian Federation's Criminal Code on 20 September, adding new penalties for “crimes against military service”, including voluntary surrender, looting, and “crimes against state power”. A soldier who surrenders, will face between three and 15 years in prison.

Significance

An undeclared, ‘hybrid' mobilisation was also ongoing in Russia since the beginning of the war in which an unknown number of employees of some defence-related companies have been called up for ‘training' in Ukraine, inmates from penal colonies were promised amnesty if they participated in the ‘special military operation', and men of conscription age were contacted and invited to sign a contract to join the military. On 15 September Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov encouraged the governors of Russian regions to “self-mobilise”, to provide at least 1,000 volunteers from each of Russia's 85 federal subjects. However, the measures of secretive, hybrid, and regional mobilisations has not fulfilled Moscow's need for manpower.

Following Putin's speech an official decree on mobilisation was released by the Kremlin. Janes analysis of the decree found that despite the Russian president declaring only a ‘partial' mobilisation, the legislative act does not define the meaning of ‘partial', neither in terms of territories, duration of contract, or categories of citizens to be deployed. The decree does not clarify the duration of the contracts of the reserves, stating that it would last “until the end of the partial mobilisation period”. It is also not restricted to reservists, stating that Russian citizens can be called up, with exceptions only in some categories, based on health condition, age, or employment within the military-industrial complex.

The lack of exact definitions of what a ‘partial' mobilisation means in the decree signals a likely intention to leave a legislative gap for a de-facto ‘full-scale' mobilisation. It is very likely that the mobilisation will gradually expand, as the exact number of citizens affected by the mobilisation was not defined in the decree, therefor would be subject to change. The decision to introduce the mobilisation cautiously is due to the Kremlin's fears of public discontent.

Outlook

The Kremlin's announcement is likely to have an impact on different levels.

  • International: referendums in the occupied territories

Moscow is planning to conduct “referendums” in Russian-occupied territories between 23 and 27 September, which are almost certainly to be used as a prelude to annexation and will very likely lead to an escalation of the war.The referendums will allow Moscow to claim a part of Ukraine's territory as an integral part of Russia, meaning that in case of an armed attack, the Kremlin will have a “justification” to use “any means” to defend the newly annexed territories.

  • Domestic: unrest

Anti-war movement “Vesna” has called for nationwide protests in Russia. The protests are likely to take place across the country on 21 September at 1900 Moscow time. The protests in Russia are likely to be widespread across the country, with the biggest protests taking place in Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg. It is very likely that hundreds of people will be detained following the protests.

  • Domestic: Russians fleeing the country

At the time of writing the Kremlin did not release details about restrictions on those subject to mobilisation looking to leave the country. The Kremlin's Press Secretary, Dmitry Peskov, said that clarifications on the possible closure of the borders for those categories will be soon released. Neighbouring Latvia declared on 21 September that it will not provide humanitarian visas to Russians, trying to escape mobilisation.It is very likely thousands of Russians, especially men of conscription age will try to leave Russia in the following days. According to Russian-speaking Telegram channels, all direct tickets to visa-free countries, such as Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan were sold out for the “nearest” dates.

  • Domestic: poor morale of troops.

The changes to legislation prior to announcement of the mobilisation indicate the Kremlin's fear of low morale among future conscripts. It is likely that demotivated soldiers will have an impact on the effectiveness of the mobilisation, as well as Russian forces' combat capability.

https://www.janes.com/defence-news/putin's-mobilisation-announcement-signals-readiness-to-escalate-ukraine-conflict-while-penal-code-amendments-indicate-kremlin's-alarm-over-lack-of-popular-support/

Putin's mobilisation announcement signals readiness to escalate Ukraine conflict, while Penal Code a...

Putin's mobilisation announcement signals readiness to escalate Ukraine conflict, while Penal Code amendments indicate Kremlin's alarm over lack of popular support

On 21 September 2022 President Vladimir Putin announced in a pre-recorded televised address a partial mobilisation of the Russian Federation for the first time since the Second World War. Putin said that the goal of the so-called ‘special operation' – the liberation of the Donbas – remains unchanged. Putin also warned the West that in the case of a threat to Russia's “territorial integrity”, he is ready to use all the means at his disposal to protect Russia, including nuclear capabilities.

In a subsequent speech Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu said that the country is fighting not Ukraine, but the “collective West”. Shoigu added that there are around 25 million Russians who fit the criteria of military reservists, but only around 1% of Russia's “mobilisation potential” will be used, with 300,000 reservists being called up.

Prior to Putin's speech, the Russian State Duma (parliament) amended the Russian Federation's Criminal Code on 20 September, adding new penalties for “crimes against military service”, including voluntary surrender, looting, and “crimes against state power”. A soldier who surrenders, will face between three and 15 years in prison.

Significance

An undeclared, ‘hybrid' mobilisation was also ongoing in Russia since the beginning of the war in which an unknown number of employees of some defence-related companies have been called up for ‘training' in Ukraine, inmates from penal colonies were promised amnesty if they participated in the ‘special military operation', and men of conscription age were contacted and invited to sign a contract to join the military. On 15 September Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov encouraged the governors of Russian regions to “self-mobilise”, to provide at least 1,000 volunteers from each of Russia's 85 federal subjects. However, the measures of secretive, hybrid, and regional mobilisations has not fulfilled Moscow's need for manpower.

Following Putin's speech an official decree on mobilisation was released by the Kremlin. Janes analysis of the decree found that despite the Russian president declaring only a ‘partial' mobilisation, the legislative act does not define the meaning of ‘partial', neither in terms of territories, duration of contract, or categories of citizens to be deployed. The decree does not clarify the duration of the contracts of the reserves, stating that it would last “until the end of the partial mobilisation period”. It is also not restricted to reservists, stating that Russian citizens can be called up, with exceptions only in some categories, based on health condition, age, or employment within the military-industrial complex.

The lack of exact definitions of what a ‘partial' mobilisation means in the decree signals a likely intention to leave a legislative gap for a de-facto ‘full-scale' mobilisation. It is very likely that the mobilisation will gradually expand, as the exact number of citizens affected by the mobilisation was not defined in the decree, therefor would be subject to change. The decision to introduce the mobilisation cautiously is due to the Kremlin's fears of public discontent.

Outlook

The Kremlin's announcement is likely to have an impact on different levels.

  • International: referendums in the occupied territories

Moscow is planning to conduct “referendums” in Russian-occupied territories between 23 and 27 September, which are almost certainly to be used as a prelude to annexation and will very likely lead to an escalation of the war.The referendums will allow Moscow to claim a part of Ukraine's territory as an integral part of Russia, meaning that in case of an armed attack, the Kremlin will have a “justification” to use “any means” to defend the newly annexed territories.

  • Domestic: unrest

Anti-war movement “Vesna” has called for nationwide protests in Russia. The protests are likely to take place across the country on 21 September at 1900 Moscow time. The protests in Russia are likely to be widespread across the country, with the biggest protests taking place in Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg. It is very likely that hundreds of people will be detained following the protests.

  • Domestic: Russians fleeing the country

At the time of writing the Kremlin did not release details about restrictions on those subject to mobilisation looking to leave the country. The Kremlin's Press Secretary, Dmitry Peskov, said that clarifications on the possible closure of the borders for those categories will be soon released. Neighbouring Latvia declared on 21 September that it will not provide humanitarian visas to Russians, trying to escape mobilisation.It is very likely thousands of Russians, especially men of conscription age will try to leave Russia in the following days. According to Russian-speaking Telegram channels, all direct tickets to visa-free countries, such as Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan were sold out for the “nearest” dates.

  • Domestic: poor morale of troops.

The changes to legislation prior to announcement of the mobilisation indicate the Kremlin's fear of low morale among future conscripts. It is likely that demotivated soldiers will have an impact on the effectiveness of the mobilisation, as well as Russian forces' combat capability.

https://www.janes.com/defence-news/putin's-mobilisation-announcement-signals-readiness-to-escalate-ukraine-conflict-while-penal-code-amendments-indicate-kremlin's-alarm-over-lack-of-popular-support/

Putin's mobilisation announcement signals readiness to escalate Ukraine conflict, while Penal Code a...

Putin's mobilisation announcement signals readiness to escalate Ukraine conflict, while Penal Code amendments indicate Kremlin's alarm over lack of popular support

On 21 September 2022 President Vladimir Putin announced in a pre-recorded televised address a partial mobilisation of the Russian Federation for the first time since the Second World War. Putin said that the goal of the so-called ‘special operation' – the liberation of the Donbas – remains unchanged. Putin also warned the West that in the case of a threat to Russia's “territorial integrity”, he is ready to use all the means at his disposal to protect Russia, including nuclear capabilities.

In a subsequent speech Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu said that the country is fighting not Ukraine, but the “collective West”. Shoigu added that there are around 25 million Russians who fit the criteria of military reservists, but only around 1% of Russia's “mobilisation potential” will be used, with 300,000 reservists being called up.

Prior to Putin's speech, the Russian State Duma (parliament) amended the Russian Federation's Criminal Code on 20 September, adding new penalties for “crimes against military service”, including voluntary surrender, looting, and “crimes against state power”. A soldier who surrenders, will face between three and 15 years in prison.

Significance

An undeclared, ‘hybrid' mobilisation was also ongoing in Russia since the beginning of the war in which an unknown number of employees of some defence-related companies have been called up for ‘training' in Ukraine, inmates from penal colonies were promised amnesty if they participated in the ‘special military operation', and men of conscription age were contacted and invited to sign a contract to join the military. On 15 September Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov encouraged the governors of Russian regions to “self-mobilise”, to provide at least 1,000 volunteers from each of Russia's 85 federal subjects. However, the measures of secretive, hybrid, and regional mobilisations has not fulfilled Moscow's need for manpower.

Following Putin's speech an official decree on mobilisation was released by the Kremlin. Janes analysis of the decree found that despite the Russian president declaring only a ‘partial' mobilisation, the legislative act does not define the meaning of ‘partial', neither in terms of territories, duration of contract, or categories of citizens to be deployed. The decree does not clarify the duration of the contracts of the reserves, stating that it would last “until the end of the partial mobilisation period”. It is also not restricted to reservists, stating that Russian citizens can be called up, with exceptions only in some categories, based on health condition, age, or employment within the military-industrial complex.

The lack of exact definitions of what a ‘partial' mobilisation means in the decree signals a likely intention to leave a legislative gap for a de-facto ‘full-scale' mobilisation. It is very likely that the mobilisation will gradually expand, as the exact number of citizens affected by the mobilisation was not defined in the decree, therefor would be subject to change. The decision to introduce the mobilisation cautiously is due to the Kremlin's fears of public discontent.

Outlook

The Kremlin's announcement is likely to have an impact on different levels.

  • International: referendums in the occupied territories

Moscow is planning to conduct “referendums” in Russian-occupied territories between 23 and 27 September, which are almost certainly to be used as a prelude to annexation and will very likely lead to an escalation of the war.The referendums will allow Moscow to claim a part of Ukraine's territory as an integral part of Russia, meaning that in case of an armed attack, the Kremlin will have a “justification” to use “any means” to defend the newly annexed territories.

  • Domestic: unrest

Anti-war movement “Vesna” has called for nationwide protests in Russia. The protests are likely to take place across the country on 21 September at 1900 Moscow time. The protests in Russia are likely to be widespread across the country, with the biggest protests taking place in Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg. It is very likely that hundreds of people will be detained following the protests.

  • Domestic: Russians fleeing the country

At the time of writing the Kremlin did not release details about restrictions on those subject to mobilisation looking to leave the country. The Kremlin's Press Secretary, Dmitry Peskov, said that clarifications on the possible closure of the borders for those categories will be soon released. Neighbouring Latvia declared on 21 September that it will not provide humanitarian visas to Russians, trying to escape mobilisation.It is very likely thousands of Russians, especially men of conscription age will try to leave Russia in the following days. According to Russian-speaking Telegram channels, all direct tickets to visa-free countries, such as Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan were sold out for the “nearest” dates.

  • Domestic: poor morale of troops.

The changes to legislation prior to announcement of the mobilisation indicate the Kremlin's fear of low morale among future conscripts. It is likely that demotivated soldiers will have an impact on the effectiveness of the mobilisation, as well as Russian forces' combat capability.

https://www.janes.com/defence-news/putin's-mobilisation-announcement-signals-readiness-to-escalate-ukraine-conflict-while-penal-code-amendments-indicate-kremlin's-alarm-over-lack-of-popular-support/

Putin's mobilisation announcement signals readiness to escalate Ukraine conflict, while Penal Code a...

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