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Intelligence-sharing failures hamper war on terrorism
- Article Tools
| 08 June 2005 |
By Michael Smith
Nearly four years after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US, multilateral sharing of intelligence on terrorist groups remains sporadic at best. Without radical changes to the way national security or intelligence services and police forces operate, improvement will be slow.
Real co-operation only exists on the basis of bilateral relationships between organisations that have traditions of working with each other, or on personal relationships between officers themselves. One official working in the terrorism field told JIR: "Most intelligence that does get passed [on] is done so via personal contacts rather than by systematic agreements to share.”
The 11 September effect
Al-Qaeda's attacks on the US in 2001 brought the danger home to many countries that had never been affected by the terrorist threat before. While the Western world undoubtedly felt an immense amount of sympathy for US suffering, there was also a large element of self-interest in building better defences against the terrorists.
While the US has not been slow to make demands that Europe co-operate with it in its war on terrorism, it has been much slower in providing reciprocal co-operation. US officials openly admit that the NOFORN (no foreign access) tag is difficult to circumvent, particularly given the siege mentality that took hold in the US in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks.
Even the UK, with its 'special relationship' with the US, has found that co-operation can be distinctly one-sided. The extradition agreement drawn up between the two countries ensures that Washington can demand extradition of a suspected terrorist without having to take its case to court to show there is sufficient evidence against the accused. However, should Britain wish to extradite a terrorist suspect from the US, it must go through the US courts.
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