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Non-Subscriber Extract

The US is putting a cap on travel

18 November 2003
The US is putting a cap on travel

By Wes Carleton

In January 2003, the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) announced the introduction of Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening, called CAPPS II, which aims to identify potential terrorists and others who might pose a threat well before they board an airliner. However, its introduction is being vehemently opposed by consumer groups on the grounds of invasion of privacy.

In turn, the TSA's plans for early tests have created apprehension about its impact on passenger numbers within the already troubled US airline industry. The US Congress has also voiced its concerns about the programme.

CAPPS II is a strengthened development of the earlier passenger-screening project CAPS, which later became CAPPS, when pre-screening passengers was introduced. While still in use, this system is generally regarded as ineffective, with its most notorious failure being its inability to prevent the 19 terrorists from boarding flights on 11 September 2001.

Following those terrorist attacks, responsibility for aviation security was transferred from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to the newly formed TSA, which immediately set about bolstering CAPPS. However, in the opinion of many observers, the new system too closely reflects the composition of its new agency, which is staffed with a preponderance of former law enforcement officials whose training has been to suspect everyone until proven otherwise. Simply put, CAPPS II is based on the assumption that until each airline passenger's background is thoroughly checked and classified, each must be regarded as a potential terrorist.

Overwhelmingly, US citizens have no objection to the notion of heightened airport security after 11 September, and the concept of a system which would, for example, check passenger names against government databases on individuals having questionable connections with terrorists or their sympathisers is generally regarded as acceptable.

However, CAPPS II would go much further. First, it would require all passengers to provide their date of birth, home address and telephone number, in addition to the current practice of names only, when purchasing an airline ticket. This data, together with 'alert' tags denoting a last minute purchase, a cash payment, and a long one way trip, would go automatically to the TSA's computers which would compare it with government databases, and derive a basic risk classification for each traveller.

But the basic data, called a Passenger Name Record (PNR), would also be sent to major airline Computer Reservation Systems (CRS), such as Galileo, Sabre, Amadeus or Worldspan. In such cases, the PNR would be linked with the passenger's past travel patterns, banking and credit records, health profile and a variety of other personal information, from which the computers would immediately respond back to the TSA with their own classification, for comparison with that derived by the TSA.

The end product would be the categorisation of ticket purchasers - but unknown to them - as being of low, medium or high risk. Low-risk passengers would pass through the normal security procedures, while medium security risks would be subject to much closer scrutiny, possibly including body x-ray examination. High-risk individuals would be apprehended, and not allowed to board.

The major concern over the CAPPS II process has been the TSA's involvement with a commercial CRS where, privacy advocates allege, the PRN would permit all aspects of a passenger's previous history to be gathered together in a way not previously possible. In turn, this would provide opportunities for 'data mining' not only by government agencies - which could retain the records for up to 50 years - but also by the CRS itself, which could use its newly assembled passenger profiles for follow on marketing purposes, or even sell them to commercial interests.

As a result, when the TSA launched its first CAPPS II test with Delta Airlines in March, it was met with a hostile public reception, including a 'Boycott Delta' Internet protest, accompanied by pleas to the public to avoid doing business with Cendant Corporation, the owner of the Galileo CRS. Within two months, Delta withdrew from the CAPPS II test.

At the same time, other pressures have been brought to bear on the TSA programme. In late 2002, two students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology published a paper that used mathematical probability theory to demonstrate that CAPPS-type systems actually improve the chances of a terrorist passing through airport security successfully.

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