Non-Subscriber Extract
Thai prime minister deposed in name of monarchy amid political uncertainty
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| 20 September 2006 |
By Christian LeMiere, Jane’s Country Risk Asia Editor
| EVENT |
| A military coup took place in Thailand at midnight (1700 GMT) on 19 September to depose caretaker Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was in New York at the time. The coup is a sign of military disaffection with governmental intervention and royalist fears of Thaksin's autocracy. In the immediate term, the lack of an interim prime minister poses the greatest risk. However, should a prime minister be forthcoming, the most likely short-term outcome will be democratic elections in November and a possible increase in political stability. |
The coup, led by Royal Thai Army (RTA) commander-in-chief Sonthi Boonyaratglin, occurred during a period of political uncertainty following nullified elections held in April 2006. Caretaker Prime Minister Thaksin came under increasing pressure to resign in late 2005 and early 2006 amid popular demonstrations in Bangkok. The demonstrations were a reflection of growing dissatisfaction with the prime minister's seeming creeping autocracy, and were galvanised (although not inspired) by the sale of the his family's telecommunications company, Shin Corp, for USD1.9 billion to a Singaporean holding company, avoiding a 30 per cent tax bill.
In response, Thaksin dissolved parliament in February and called elections in April. However, the parliamentary opposition boycotted the elections owing to an awareness that Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party remained likely to win, owing to support among the rural population. The boycott subsequently led to the elections being declared void in May 2006 by the electoral commission, and fresh elections being called for 15 October.
Problems caused by the lack of a constitutionally acceptable parliament were exacerbated by the uncertainty over Thaksin's position. He resigned immediately after the April elections, only to return as caretaker prime minister after one month. Nonetheless, the military ostensibly remained detached from the political process, in contrast to the cycle of military interventions that occurred during the Cold War period.
This military objectivity became increasingly untenable in mid-2006. Concerns within the military that Thaksin was promoting his allies, in particular fellow classmates of class 10 from the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School (Thaksin attended the school in 1967 and is currently a police lieutenant-colonel) to ranks beyond their experience in order to secure the military before the October elections created greater resentment within the armed forces already concerned about the country's political situation. For instance, the proposed promotion of First Royal Guard commander and class 10 classmate Major General Prin Suwannathat to First Army Corps commander in an annual reshuffle, despite Sonthi's demand that he only become deputy commander, appeared to be a direct attempt by Thaksin to increase his influence over the military region of Bangkok before elections. An assassination attempt on the prime minister in late August reflected the level of resentment within the military.
The current coup appears to be motivated not only by this military dissatisfaction, but also a desire by royalists within the political elite to secure the monarchy in the face of Thaksin's increasing power. With implicit fears over the longevity of the 79-year old King Bhumibol's reign, and with Thaksin commanding an unprecedented simple majority in parliament, royalists fear that the strongest elected executive in Thai history could undermine the monarchy's remaining constitutional power and influence.
There is as yet no indication of the King's involvement in the coup, and it seems more likely that royalists are acting in his name, rather than under his command. Indeed, Jane's sources have suggested that the Administrative Reform Council's (ARC's) proposed prime ministerial candidate, former RTA commander-in-chief and current Privy Council member General Surayudh Chulanont, was not accepted by the palace.
| FORECAST |
| It is this lack of an interim prime minister that poses the greatest risk to the current situation in the immediate term. With no prime minister there is a lack of direction within the ARC, and an opportunity for Thaksin loyalists to capitalise on the interim government's weakness. Although an organised counter-coup by class 10 classmates and Thaksin loyalists in the military may prove impossible, given the speed and efficiency with which the coup occurred, localised mutinies are conceivable. Such military instability will be exacerbated by the lack of prime minister. However, should a suitable candidate be found then the ARC will likely attempt to hold elections by November 2006, prior to the King's birthday in December. Thaksin will no doubt be excluded from these polls, and a new government formed. |
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