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Bush pursues missile defence dialogue to leave Cold War trappings behind
- Article Tools
| 10 May 2001 |
By David J Smith*
On 1 May President George W Bush set America on a clear course toward "missile defences that could defend the United States, our deployed forces, our friends and our allies". Options being considered include ground-, sea-, air- and space-based elements. Bush wants to "leave behind" the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and unilaterally slash strategic nuclear weapons to the "lowest possible number".
By the time the President delivered his address at the National Defense University, its general thrust had become known and Washington was abuzz with shopworn counter-arguments to missile defence. Among these was that US allies would be infuriated and Russia would go berserk. Surprisingly, the reaction to Bush's calm, logical explanation has been restraint at home and abroad. Senator Joe Biden, the characteristically outspoken ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, opted for a wait-and-see approach. The day after Bush's announcement, Washington moved on to his next agenda item: partial privatisation of social security.
Moscow's immediate reaction did not match the decibel level of its opposition to President Clinton's National Missile Defense plan in the weeks leading up to the June 2000 Clinton-Putin summit. State Duma International Relations Committee Chairman Dimitry Rogozin dusted off his talking points, warning that Russia might pull out of the START II Treaty if Washington abandons the ABM Treaty. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov offered a perfunctory defence of the ABM Treaty but welcomed Bush's call for nuclear cuts. Moscow will undoubtedly ratchet up its rhetoric to test Bush's resolve, but if the new US President remains steadfast, Russia may list toward the constructive view of Vladimir Lukin, Duma member and former ambassador to Washington: "Bush's statement opens the possibility for serious talks with the Americans."
In Beijing, Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao noted only that the Bush proposal would "spark a new round of the arms race". Other Chinese officials were unavailable due to the week-long celebration of Labour Day.
Among allies there were doubts and questions, but mostly a welcoming of close consultations with Washington. Perhaps British Prime Minister Tony Blair was most cautiously positive, saying: "President Bush has set out a case that we have to listen to." That is surely the reaction Bush sought. "These will be real consultations," the US President has stated. "We are not presenting our friends and allies with unilateral decisions." High-level teams from Washington began consultations in Asia, Australia, Canada and Europe this week.
Bush's speech stuck to the big picture to focus discussion on his call for a new, truly post-Cold War intellectual framework that answers allied concerns about arms control, strategic stability and a new arms race. It is human, of course, to cling to what we know, but a stark assessment of Cold War stability principles should push us toward better solutions. The USA and USSR were locked in intractable ideological conflict that led inevitably to clashes - Berlin, Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Angola - that could have escalated into nuclear war. Unable to resolve the conflict, uninvent nuclear missiles or - it was widely perceived - defend against them, the two sides accepted what Bush called the "grim premise" of mutual assured destruction, or MAD.
MAD required maintenance by each side of an unmistakable, secure retaliatory capability, preferably unchallenged by quantitative or qualitative improvements (such as defences) that could lead to an arms race. The sides attempted to codify stability so defined in the SALT-START process, of which the ABM Treaty is part.
Today - no matter what disagreements the West may have with Russia - the fundamental ideological conflict is gone. The US-Russian military clash that could lead to nuclear escalation is hard to imagine. Of course, both sides will maintain significantly reduced deterrent forces for some time, but Bush is calling for a change in the "relationship from one based on nuclear terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests." In such a relationship, Bush's argument is that Russia should not fear US and allied missile defences any more than America fears unilateral nuclear reductions. Regular mutual assurance talks could maintain real transparency and understanding, addressing concerns over stability and arms races better than thousands of pages of arcane arms control language ever did.
The discussion of emerging security concerns could also be on the agenda. Then, if President Putin wants to build on his recent proposal, US-allied-Russian missile defence co-operation - though easier said than done - would hardly be out of the question.
* David J Smith is president of Global Horizons, Inc, consulting on defence and foreign affairs. During the Bush (I) Administration (1989-1992) he was US ambassador to the US-Soviet Defense and Space Talks dealing with the ABM Treaty.