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Zarqawi's war on the Shia
Zarqawi's war on the Shia
Sunni Islamic political movements have long had a problem with the Shia branch of the faith - which some consider heretical. Judging from the plethora of Sunni doctrinal websites, many of which predate the Iraq invasion, where aggressive vilification of the Shia as Rawafidh (Rejectionists) is common currency, Al-Qaeda's pragmatic, and incremental approach on the issue is not generally shared. In this respect, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's more extreme position is simply a militant expression of this widespread sentiment.
Zarqawi is wagering on a popular and passive acquiescence to his war against Shia 'heretics and traitors'. But there are indications that he may be losing the bet. Ideological murmurings first emerged in late 2004 when Zarqawi's imprisoned mentor and one of the most influential clerics of the Salafi-Jihadi current, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, published a booklet entitled Waqafat ma'a Thamarat Al-Jihad (Deliberations on the fruits of jihad) where he criticised the 'dwarfisation' of the jihad through rash excess, and Munasarah wa-Munasahah li-Abi Musab Al-Zarqawi, a long treatise of 'support and advice' to Zarqawi.
In this latter work Maqdisi, evidently an ardent anti-Shiite to judge from his numerous writings, argued that killing ordinary Shia citizens was not permitted in Islam, since they are not to be considered infidels, and insisted that suicide bombings were only acceptable in extreme and exceptional circumstances, not in an uncontrolled fashion "due to a misguided understanding of the rules of warfare".
Ayman al-Zawahiri developed the same point in the letter intercepted by US forces. He noted in his advice that a clash between the Sunni-dominated movement and the Shiite community in Iraq "will happen sooner or later", but warned Zarqawi against the public relations damage that this was causing. "Questions will do the rounds among mujahideen circles and their opinion formers concerning the propriety of this clash with the Shia at this time," he stated. "Is it inevitable or is it something that can be put off until the robustness of the mujahid movement in Iraq is strengthened? Is the opening of another front now, in addition to the American front and the government front, a wise decision?"
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