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Proliferation of MANPADS and the threat to civil aviation
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| 13 August 2003 |
The threat to civil aviation from manportable air defence systems (MANPADS) was illustrated in last November's failed attack on an Israeli airliner departing Kenya's Mombasa airport. As JTIC noted at the time, the attack was not an isolated incident - terrorists have targeted airliners using MANPADS and other stand-off weapons since the 1970s. Thomas Withington looks at the illicit proliferation of MANPADS and the likelihood of their further use by the world's terrorist and insurgent groups.
The missile attack on an Israeli Arkia Airlines Boeing 757-300 on November 28 provided a stark illustration of the threat posed to civil aviation from terrorists armed with MANPADS. The use of two Russian SA-7 (aka K32M 'Strela-2') MANPADS demonstrated that the proliferation of such weapons is still a major cause of concern.
The Mombasa attack is, of course, not the first time terrorists have targeted civil aviation with MANPADS - such weapons have been used to down civilian aircraft as far afield as Africa, South America, the Balkans and Chechnya.
Proliferation of MANPADS
It is now believed that MANPADS form part of the arsenal of weapons available to almost 30 insurgent and terrorist groups worldwide, their apparent proliferation on the black market making them relatively easy and, depending on the model in question, cheap to acquire.
In December last year, International Security Assistance Force troops in Afghanistan were reportedly offered FIM-92A `Stinger' MANPADS at a cost of US$250,000 each. The Stinger was widely distributed by the CIA among rebel Mujahideen groups fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s, and proved lethal against both fixed- and rotary-wing targets. Given the weapon's record against agile military aircraft - at least 270 confirmed kills - the threat that such an advanced system poses to much slower civil aviation is obvious. Conservative estimates state that at least 100 such missiles are still in the country out of around 900 originally supplied.
The Stinger's reputation as an effective anti-aircraft weapon obscures the fact that many other far more numerous types of MANPAD are available to terrorists, most of which are likely to prove equally as great a threat to civil aviation in the correct circumstances.
The problem of proliferation is exacerbated by weapons such as the SA-7, which is built under licence in several countries. Furthermore, systems like the SA-7 are significantly cheaper to purchase on the black market than Western MANPADS such as Stinger. Prices for an SA-7 missile can be as low as US$5,000. Sadly, the sheer numbers of MANPADS produced by Soviet-bloc states during the Cold War has made it very difficult to produce an accurate assessment of how many weapons may be available. One estimate talks of `tens of thousands' of SA-7 missiles in circulation.
At first glance, the proliferation of MANPADS seems to create a nightmarish vision in which all civilian aircraft are threatened by, and defenceless from, such weapons. However, their use against a civilian aircraft is not as simple as the `fire-and-forget' catchphrase earned by the Stinger would suggest. During the attack in Kenya, the fact that the missiles failed to strike suggests operator inexperience or a fault in the missile's guidance system. Reports have also circulated that the Israeli aircraft may have been fitted with anti-missile countermeasures.
Hitting the target is made more difficult by MANPADS requiring the operator to track the target while manually directing the missile's flight - so called `command-to-line-of-sight' weapons. The British Army learnt these limitations during the Falklands War in 1982 when using the `Blowpipe' MANPADS. Even Stinger, widely thought to be one of the easiest MANPADS to operate, has its limitations. The CIA experienced considerable difficulty teaching the basics of such a weapon to the Mujahideen, many of whom were illiterate.
The operator must take ground `clutter' into account when firing a heat-seeking MANPADS. If some missiles are fired too close to the ground, they can be distracted by other heat sources. One complaint allegedly voiced about the SA-7 by Mujahedin in Afghanistan was that when fired, the missiles would occasionally fly towards the sun rather than the target aircraft. Furthermore, some MANPADS, including the SA-7, leave a visible, white vapour trail which can easily betray the position of the launcher.
Range to target is also an important consideration. The closer the range, the less opportunity the missile will have to correct its flightpath if ground clutter, countermeasures, or other 'distractions' result in a temporary loss of target acquisition. Therefore, launching the weapon from very close range does not necessarily guarantee a hit.
Even if the missile finds its target, there is no guarantee that it will be destroyed, especially if the target is a large commercial airliner. Building regulations for aircraft jet engines insist that the engine is surrounded by an armoured envelope to contain the core during an explosion. The problem of achieving a hit after the first launch is aggravated by modern `high-bypass' airliner engines, which have a much cooler exhaust than the high-performance military jets or helicopters.
However, there are many attractions for attacking a civilian airliner with MANPADS. Firstly, because of the ranges of MANPADS (between 500 - 5,500 metres for the SA-7; and 1,000m - 8,000m for the Stinger) an operative can be stationed some distance from the airport and away from its security staff. A successful attack by a MANPADS against a civilian airliner flying into or out of a city could have the added impact of causing heavy, secondary casualties on the ground. Whilst some experts point to the finite `self-life' of MANPADS missiles, a technically proficient terrorist group would probably be able to replace perishable components, such as the battery for the electronic systems, with home-made equivalents. The life of the missiles is enhanced as they are shipped in sealed containers designed to protect the missile when it is deployed in the field. It has been said that under ideal conditions, the lifespan of some MANPADS missiles can extend to over 20 years.
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