Non-Subscriber Extract
JTIC exclusive - Singapore government report reveals extent of Islamic terrorist threat in Southeast Asia
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| 20 January 2003 |
In December 2001, the people of Singapore were confronted with the reality of Islamic terrorism on their doorstep when officers of the country's Internal Security Department (ISD) arrested 15 people, 13 of whom were alleged to be members of the banned Islamic terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyya (JI). While two were later released, the remaining 13 are still in custody.
In August 2002, the ISD arrested a further 21 people, all but two of whom, the government claims, are also JI members, the remaining two being members of Philippine separatist group the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
The arrests were made after security services learned of plots by the JI to bomb government and western targets in Singapore.
This month, Singapore's Home Affairs Ministry published a report on the activities of JI in the country. The document provides useful detail on the structure and activities of the group from the mid-1990s to the present. But of particular interest are the ministry's findings on the JI's links not only to a web of like-minded Islamic militant groups in southeast Asia, but also to Osama bin Laden's global Al-Qaeda network.
Also included is a useful examination of the recruitment and indoctrination of JI members based on interviews with detained operatives. The motivations of group members are also discussed.
Much of the report outlines how militant Islamic groups across southeast Asia have co-operated and shared personnel, funds, and training facilities in furtherance of their Jihad. It also provides evidence of the presence of Al-Qaeda in the region and its efforts to use organisations such as the JI as proxy groups to strike at Western interests.
The report alleges that of the groups active in the region it is JI which enjoys the closest relations with Al-Qaeda. Through a network of 'sleeper' agents and handlers operating under false identities, Al-Qaeda is able to provide material support to these groups and, at least in the case of the JI, to exert some influence over their choice of targeting. Such links are mutually advantageous - local groups receive funds and training, while Al-Qaeda effectively acquires a ready-made network of terrorist cells, thus negating the requirement to build such a network from scratch.
The JI's ultimate strategic objective is to use terrorism to bring about the creation of an Islamic Caliphate across southeast Asia. According to the report, JI believed it could first engineer the overthrow of the Singapore and Malaysian governments by mounting a series of terrorist strikes against targets in Singapore. The attacks would be represented as acts of aggression by the Malaysian government. The JI hoped that the result would be an erosion of trust between the two governments, a 'Muslim Malaysia' and a 'Chinese Singapore', and eventual ethnic strife. At this point, it was reasoned that Muslims in both countries would respond to calls for a Jihad, which would ultimately bring down both administrations.
Of particular note are findings on the JI methods of recruitment and indoctrination. Potential candidates were first identified through religious study groups, where they would be introduced to discussion of Jihad and the world-wide plight of Muslim populations. Students demonstrating a particular interest in Jihadi theology were then engaged specifically over a period of around 18 months, and made to feel a sense of exclusivity by their recruiters.
Certain students were selected as JI members and gradually subjected to well- documented techniques of escalating commitment, the report states. They were first taught that anyone who left the group was an infidel, and that all Muslims who did not subscribe to Jihad were also infidels - a dogmatism designed to convince group members that even the killing of innocent Muslims was justified.
Members were then required to take an oath called the Bai'ah, pledging allegiance to the group's emir, or leader. This was often followed by a form of 'psychological contracting' in which, following their attendance at a particularly fiery sermon, group members would be asked to fill in forms indicating their choice of responsibilities, up to and including martyrdom. Having signed these contracts, members were not permitted to reverse their decision. According to the report, this proved a most effective technique - while some members admitted to having had 'cold feet' about certain operations, they felt they could not withdraw because they were already 'in too deep'.
Far from playing down the threat of Islamic terrorism, the publication of a such a report marks a public acceptance by the government that Singapore is being used not only as a base of operations by JI, but that the group is actively plotting to destabilise the country in hopes of generating a popular Islamist uprising.
The report suggests that a response well beyond short-term security measures and intelligence-led counter-terrorist operations is necessary if groups such as the JI are to be countered effectively - and even then, it states, the threat may only be minimised rather than defeated altogether.
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