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19 January 2007
Losing ground - the future of central government in Iraq
By Michael Knights Scenario one: Unitary IraqProbability - Low This scenario addresses the prospect that the government recovers some degree of centralised authority in 2007. Indicators that this scenario is coming to pass would include the successful achievement of the set of milestones that Maliki has committed to undertake. These include the approval of key legislation, the completion of negotiations on amnesty arrangements and a constitutional amendment by the end of April 2007, holding provincial elections by June 2007, a handover of the Iraqi Army to Ministry of Defence control by September 2007, and a handover of all provinces to Iraqi control by December 2007. However, these milestones are likely to be too ambitious and would require near-perfect political conditions, without disruptive events such as the 22 February 2006 bombing of the al-Askariyya mosque in Samarra. Although the intensity of the insurgency is unlikely to decrease notably, the development of a more reliable Iraqi Army could increase government control gradually, with a probable focus on slowly reducing violence in Baghdad. The only potential risk of such a policy would be the resurgent role of the Iraqi Army at the centre of Iraqi politics. Scenario two: De facto partitionProbability - High Unsurprisingly, this scenario is considered to be the most likely and has been accorded a high probability. The sectarian and factional issues witnessed in 2006 are powerful and highly stable, suggesting more of the same in 2007. In the security realm, the government is highly unlikely to regain a monopoly of violence in 2006 no matter how successful its development of the Iraqi Army. The key dynamics are not between the government and the militias or insurgents, but arguably between the various armed sub-state groups themselves. The multinational presence in Iraq will slowly draw down in 2007, but not significantly enough to end the sense of an occupation. Instead, the key effect of withdrawal is likely to be to exacerbate sectarian and factional grievances that have been restrained to a degree since 2003. As local dynamics unfold, the government will continue to function periodically as an arbitrator but will not have the capacity to intervene decisively in the multiple conflicts and power struggles being undertaken in various parts of Iraq simultaneously. With the key political events in the coming year likely to be the provincial elections, the focus on local politics is likely to grow even stronger in 2007. Scenario three: Government collapseProbability - Low The third scenario envisages a catastrophic and sudden collapse of the government. This would require an unprecedented breakdown in relations between the three major ethnic and religious groups, namely Shia, Sunni and Kurd. It is doubtful whether this could be caused by a simple repetition of the al-Askariyya mosque bombing. This event did not seriously curtail the executive or legislative activities under way in early 2006, demonstrating the surprisingly strong commitment that Iraqis from all communities have shown to the political process. Rather, a decisive government collapse would probably need to be triggered by a serious disagreement between two large parliamentary factions. One situation could be an irreconcilable breach between the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Sadrist factions. Arguably a more plausible precursor to government collapse could be a Kurdish paramilitary advance on Kirkuk or a declaration of statehood in advance of the 31 December 2007 deadline for resolving the issue. 543 of 4,332 words © 2007 Jane's Information Group [End of non-subscriber extract] Customers with a paid subscription to Jane’s Intelligence Review can access the full article here If you would like to subscribe, please see our products section for more information and pricing on Intelligence Review |
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