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Barriers to conflict: a concrete solution to shifting concerns?

Barriers to conflict: a concrete solution to shifting concerns?

Separation barriers are not a new phenomenon. Throughout history, from the Great Wall of China to the Berlin Wall, barriers have been constructed to keep armies from invading and protect territory. The bipolar, confrontational international nature of the Cold War encouraged further wall building - such as the 300 km Cypriot separation barrier created in 1974 by Turkey and the 250 km wall created by South Korea in the demilitarised zone between 1977 and 1979 - as lingering disputes simmered and tense military situations continued to unnerve governments.

The post-Cold War era was initially defined to some extent by lowering constraints to cross-border migration as free trade and globalisation led to economic integration. The need to deter entire armies through barriers and walls diminished and construction of new barriers decreased (except for the 192 km 1991 Iraq-Kuwait fence).

However, as security concerns have slowly shifted to non-state threats, particularly since 2001, the number and speed of separation barrier constructions have increased dramatically. The motivation behind this is no longer to stop massed armed formations from rolling across borders or boundaries, but to prevent cross-border asymmetric threats such as illegal migration, organised crime and militancy of terrorism.

Unfortunately, the effectiveness of barriers is not always taken into account before construction begins and the fence or wall may be a knee-jerk reaction to a problem that would be better solved in another way.

The following five recent or planned constructions reflect the current trend for barrier-building. Our analysis of these constructions has been separated into motivations for the barrier, the barrier's logistics and the likely or current effects of the barrier.

The success of these separation fences and barriers depends both on their physical construction and the perceived threat. Partial fences, such as those envisaged by the US, are unlikely to succeed given the ease in circumventing them. Similarly, barriers across lengthy borders will struggle to succeed given the cost in maintaining patrols and outposts to prevent incursion. Countries or territories with a variety of entry points, such as Spain, will find it difficult to prevent movement through the weakest point. Natural barriers, such as the mountains and ravines in Kashmir, help border security but also make it difficult to survey these areas.

Evidently, the most successful barriers are fixed, contiguous constructions along short borders or lines, with electronic sensors and surveillance and regular border guard outposts and patrols designed to prevent movement into a small area with few other alternative entry points.

However, the success of any separation barrier will only ever be partial. Ultimately, the motivation of those people wishing to bypass a barrier, be it economic migrants, organised criminals or militants, will determine the lengths to which they will go and therefore how effective a barrier may be. Ironically, the construction of a separation barrier may heighten people's ambition to bypass the barrier, either by increasing resentment against the builder, amplifying feelings of repression, or highlighting the wealth differentials between populations. As such, although violence and cross-border militancy may be reduced in the short term by barriers, such as in the Israel-West Bank and the Kashmir Line of Control constructions, the drivers for the violence will continue, and hence so will the conflict.

Barriers planned or under construction
Barrier	Length constructed (km)	Length planned (km)	Beginning of construction
Israel-West Bank	211	681	2003
Kashmir	760	760	1980s (reinvigorated in 2003)
Ceuta and Melilla	18.3	18.3	1999-2000
US-Mexico	130	592/1,123	1980s (restarting in 2006-07?)
Saudi-Yemen-Iraq	0	814	2006?

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