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Pyongyang goes for broke
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| 27 February 2003 |
By Yihong Chang and James Foley
Pyongyang has three objectives in the stand-off with Washington that began when the USA presented the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) with evidence of its uranium enrichment programme in October 2002.
These include diplomatic recognition by Washington of the DPRK; the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two countries; and assurance that 'the USA will not hinder the DPRK's economic development'.
While the first two points are clear, the last could be interpreted as a demand that the DPRK be removed from Washington's list of States Sponsoring Terror, thus clearing the way for Pyongyang to gain access to international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Asian Development Bank. It might also refer to Pyongyang's wish that Washington fulfils its commitment to build a light-water reactor, as promised under the 1994 Agreed Framework.
Kim Jong-il's diplomacy
While North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is alert to the gravity of the domestic economic situation in the DPRK, he also appears to have a thorough understanding of the international agenda, and knows how best to exploit US weaknesses. Since US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelley confronted the regime with evidence of North Korea's pursuit of a nuclear programme, Pyongyang has maintained the upper hand. Kim has been hard-line on some occasions and flexible on others. While purposefully escalating his rhetoric, Kim has at the same time left room for negotiation, and paid close attention to international opinion.
Kim has gradually raised the stakes. First, North Korea claimed it would restart the original heavy-water reactor; then it dismantled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seals on its nuclear facilities and expelled IAEA inspectors, presenting a tough attitude to the outside world. However, during this process, North Korea has left itself room to turn back, repeatedly saying that Pyongyang is willing to start negotiations with the USA.
Pyongyang has stressed that the purpose of its actions is not to develop nuclear weapons, but rather to augment its meagre energy resources by restarting its old-fashioned nuclear reactor - a measure made necessary by the USA's failure to meet its obligations under the 1994 Agreed Framework. In reality, the reactor has been sealed for a long time, and cannot be easily brought back to operation. It is apparent that North Korea's actions are of symbolic rather than of practical significance.
Dragging Washington into talks
Despite Washington's insistence that the crisis over the DPRK's nuclear programmes be referred to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and despite Pyongyang's rhetoric, the DPRK's latest pronouncements show that it is prepared to concede more than ever if bilateral talks can take place.
The quid pro quo from Pyongyang for such negotiations would be the DPRK's willingness 'to resolve all matters of concern pertaining between the DPRK and USA'. The phrase 'all matters of concern' has clearly widened the range of security issues to include the size and disposition of the DPRK's conventional forces - something the Bush administration first insisted on in August 2001. Clearly, Pyongyang is aiming for, and offering, nothing less than a comprehensive settlement with Washington, which could include nuclear weapons, missile development and proliferation, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional force posture. In return the DPRK wants recognition and security guarantees.
It is this desire to drag Washington into bilateral talks that lies behind Pyongyang's decision to increase tension in the region. It upped the ante by announcing that it was breaking UN seals and dismantling monitoring equipment from its experimental five-MW reactor at Yongbyon, and ordering the three IAEA inspectors resident on site to leave the country by 31 December. Next came the DPRK's announcement that it was quitting the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 10 January 2003. On 5 February Pyongyang announced it had 'restored normal operations' at its Yongbyon plant. With these steps the DPRK cleared the way for the re-starting of plutonium production at Yongbyon, and also the possibility that it could begin extracting plutonium from the spent fuel rods stored in 400 stainless steel canisters in the spent fuel building at Yongbyon by late March. The IAEA estimates the rods to contain between 25-30kg of plutonium; enough for five or six nuclear weapons.
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