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Milosevic behind bars: anatomy of an arrest
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| 02 April 2001 |
By JIR Special Correspondent Zoran Kusovac
Slobodan Milosevic, former president of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia, was arrested in the small hours of the morning of Sunday 1 April and taken into custody into Belgrade's County Jail, better known under its Communist-era name of Central Jail.
The arrest of Milosevic followed 36 hours of tension and drama unfolding under the eyes of the media and thousands of citizens of Belgrade, which included an unsuccessful attempt on Saturday night to storm Milosevic's villa and take him in by force.
Calls to arrest the former Serbian strongman were first made after he was forced to step down from power after losing the presidential elections in September 2000. Milosevic's stubborn refusal to recognise that - despite his attempt to rig the vote - Vojislav Kostunica, a candidate of the joint Serbian opposition, had won in the first round resulted in a popular uprising. Realising that both the army and the police refused to use force to keep him in saddle, Slobodan Milosevic accepted defeat on 6 October 2000.
Kostunica, meanwhile, a conservative lawyer, refused to recognise either the validity of the war crimes indictment against Slobodan Milosevic, issued by the Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), or popular calls to arrest him for alleged political wrongdoings or purely criminal acts. Kostunica practically fought his own Quixotic battle against the New World Order, which he believed was represented by ICTY. He initially refused to receive ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte on her first visit to Belgrade. When, under pressure, he finally had to take the meeting, according to Del Ponte's own account it turned into a pathetic political lecture.
In protecting Milosevic, Kostunica protected the very idea of Serbian nationalism of which he is so fond. Such a policy quickly resulted in him gaining the support of most of Milosevic's former staunch supporters, but also the dismay of the international community. Reassured by such a "patriotic" attitude from his successor, Milosevic slowly started emerging from his initial isolation and once again began to assume a political role. He again took up the reins of the Serbian Socialist Party (SPS), which, now in opposition, re-elected him party president despite the defeat.
However, elections held in Serbia in December produced a pragmatic government under Zoran Djindjic, a man of little ideology but known for his ability to trade in anything. The US Congress offered to trade in Milosevic by passing a resolution that would block US$ 100 million in much-needed aid - and promise to cause further difficulties to the cash-hungry new authorities in Belgrade - unless by 31 March they demonstrated beyond any doubt a willingness to co-operate with the ICTY. Although never expressed as simply as that, there was little doubt that the arrest of Milosevic, even if he were not immediately packed off to The Hague, would offer that ultimate proof. There was little doubt that Djindjic - unlike Kostunica - was willing to arrest Milosevic, but even he needed some legal grounds.
Those apparently came from the confession of one of Milosevic's former closest associates, the erstwhile high official of the State Security Directorate (RDB) and later head of the Federal Customs Directorate (SUC) Mihaly Kertesz. Arrested in November 2000 on charges of blatant misappropriation of funds and countless other irregularities, Kertesz is believed to have co-operated with the investigators beyond any expectations. The investigators must have had legal grounds to indict Milosevic for quite some time, but there seemed to be no political will to do so.
While Kostunica kept refusing to arrest Milosevic out of his own reasons and "principles", the rift between him and Djindjic kept widening. The federal president was set to "restore national and patriotic values"; the Serbian prime minister was after concrete improvements to his country and its subjects. However, both were always wary of each other and both tried to secure a wider power base. Kostunica did that by taking the Yugoslav Army (VJ) under his wing, promising the generals who were involved in at least questionable activities during the wars in ex-Yugoslavia - particularly in Kosovo - that no questions would be asked. Djindjic, also preparing for what most observers now see as an inevitable show-down of political force, took over control and ensured the backing of the almost as numerous Serbian Interior Ministry (MUP).
As the US Congress-imposed 31 March deadline approached, it became obvious that Kostunica would stubbornly resist allowing Milosevic to be arrested under any charge. However, barely two weeks before the deadline Djindjic visited Washington - and decided to take action despite Kostunica's opposition and obstruction.
Eight former high officials of Milosevic's regime were arrested last week, all on charges of embezzlement of funds and misuse of authority. Those included Nikola Sainovic, the former Serbian deputy prime minister believed to have been personally in charge of co-ordinating the actions of Serbian security forces against Kosovo Albanians (which earned him an indictment for war crimes from the ICTY). Although there is no hard proof, it seems that this mass arrest of Milosevic's former 'top brass' was a proof-of-concept. Pro-Milosevic forces, led by the SPS, had long been making noises, claiming they would mobilise the masses to prevent any arrests. They even formed a 'people's guard', which, although consisting mostly of sexa- and septuagenarians and never exceeding few hundred, braved the elements to patrol Milosevic's presidential villa in the exclusive residential area of Dedinje.
With the arrest of eight former high officials causing hardly any adverse reaction, Djindjic was probably reassured that arresting Milosevic would not result in any significant popular opposition.
Despite his downfall, however, Milosevic had retained a significant security detail. His personal protection unit, believed to number over two dozen officers, continued to be led by his long-time and most trusted bodyguard police general Senta Milenkovic, head of the MUP's VIP protection unit. In addition, Kalashnikov-toting men dressed in black fatigues were sighted inside the compound. They were believed to belong to Kosmos, officially a protection agency owned by Milosevic's wife's extreme-left JUL party. Finally, hand-picked soldiers from the 1st Motorised Guards Brigade guarded the outside perimeter of the compound.
On Friday 30 March President Kostunica, perceived as the main and most stubborn obstacle to arresting Milosevic, was on an official visit to Geneva. The alarm sounded at 18.00 hrs in the form of the mobile phone of Branislav Ivkovic, the Socialists' party whip. Alarmed at what he heard, Ivkovic announced to the Serbian parliament that "an attempt was underway to arrest Milosevic", asked for parliamentary adjournment and rushed off to Dedinje. Media representatives followed suit, as did the citizens of Belgrade.
As it turned out, most of those citizens were in fact those in favour of Milosevic's arrest -- under whatever charge. Among the crowd of several thousand that gathered at the corner of Uzicka and Konavoska streets, less than two hundred claimed to be there to prevent the arrest, and their ages and physical conditions, rather than their numbers, lent little credibility to their claims.
Rumours about the imminent arrest spread like bushfire, but officials denied any knowledge. A motorcade of Mercedes four-wheel drives with darkened windows, which was seen driving off from Dedinje and entering the underground garage of the downtown building of the Belgrade District Court, was interpreted as the arresting party taking the former president for questioning. Those claims, however, were dispelled when several high officials of the Socialist Party contacted via mobile telephones, claimed that they were with Milosevic inside his residence. Around midnight the gate briefly opened and a defiant Milosevic greeted the handful of would-be defenders. Journalists from Belgrade's fiercely independent B92 radio even managed to reach Milosevic himself on the phone - just to hear that he was "at home drinking coffee with his friends".
Just as the whole arrest story was about to be called a hoax, tensions were raised by the appearance of several vans full of balaclava-clad men with rifles. Around 02.00 hrs they used a van to force the gate open and storm the villa. A hail of bullets greeted them from inside, wounding two police officers and a press photographer. Although the attackers succeeded in gaining some ground, and even breaking into the house through the windows, the attack was apparently called off.
At this point official accounts do not exactly tally with what was seen on the ground. Firstly, the claim by the authorities that the forces that stormed the villa belonged to the Serbian Interior Ministry are almost certainly not true. While the MUP was often used and abused in a political role and even spearheaded actions against civilians, it cannot be claimed that its special units were amateurs. Rather, they were - and remain - a formidable force capable of performing not just the usual SWAT-type operations, but also engaging enemy military forces on both conventional and unconventional terms. The poorly co-ordinated and seemingly confused would-be special forces that stormed Milosevic's villa, however, were nowhere near the standards of the MUP's crack Special Anti-terrorist Unit (SAJ) or even the lower-grade former Special Police Units (PJPs). This suggests that these men, who were dressed in jeans and track-suits, were not members of the MUP at all - or at least had not been for long prior to Saturday night. Rather, they most likely belonged to the same armed groups that are known to have been deployed in readiness throughout Belgrade during the 5 October 2000 'revolution'. Their task was to intercept any police or military units that might decide to deploy against the people storming the federal parliament and Belgrade TV buildings.
Djindjic himself has confirmed the existence of these groups in several interviews. At the time they were believed to be under the command, or at least co-ordination, of Cedomir 'Ceda' Jovanovic, a 29-year-old former student leader-turned-politician and member of Djindjic's Democratic Party (DS).
Subsequent events over the weekend would not immediately clarify the mystery as to why such an unofficial and unconventional group was used, but there are two possibilities, both equally interesting. The first is that even the organisers of the arrest feared the possibility of Milosevic's supporters turning out in tens of thousands and managing to thwart his arrest - in which case it would have been very convenient to claim that the action was performed by "a group of bounty hunters" eager to collect the still-valid $5 million reward offered by the USA for Milosevic's capture. However, more grounds for concern would be in order should the second hypothesis be true: that the loyalty of the real MUP special units could not be fully trusted.
Saturday morning's official accounts of the previous night's events claimed that the 'commander of the unit' that stormed the villa, having called the attack off, then proceeded inside himself to talk to the occupants. He is alleged to have encountered "a group of inebriated civilians" led by a known militant, Sinisa Vucinic. The group was armed with assault rifles, machine guns, anti-tank rockets and hand grenades, with just one MUP officer in charge of Milosevic's personal protection.
Only then did it become clear what caused Branislav Ivkovic's mobile phone to ring in parliament that Friday afternoon. According to Serbian law - within legislation passed during Milosevic's reign - former presidents are entitled to a lifetime escort of one police officer. Despite this law, however, Milosevic had kept a large security detail for a full six months, with no official attempt ever being made to bring it within legal limits. That was only done on Friday afternoon, when as yet unidentified representatives of the state entered Milosevic's compound and ordered all but one MUP officer - including General Senta Milenkovic - to leave. They obeyed. Officially, this was made possible by the new organisation of the Serbian MUP - now controlled by Minister Dusan Mihajlovic and loyal to Prime Minister Djindjic - under which the VIP protection unit as such was disbanded and its former members reassigned to various other duties. It also emerged that those same officials issued the same orders to the VJ security detail that was guarding the villa from outside. However, the officer in charge of the military guard - reported to be a certain colonel or general named Bojovic - apparently obeyed the order to withdraw his men but handed the keys of the perimeter gates to the occupants of the villa rather than to whoever brought him the orders.
This behaviour from a military unit caused an immediate reaction. Saturday's edition of the main Belgrade daily, Politika, which has always been close to the Serbian government of the time, printed a stunning and direct accusation that (VJ Chief of Staff) General Pavkovic had prevented Milosevic's arrest, claiming that the revelation came from "a most reliable source". Even more spectacular was Politika's claim that "General Pavkovic did not decide that himself, but he was ordered to do it". This was a direct public accusation levelled at Federal President Vojislav Kostunica - who prides himself on being a strict, almost fanatic, legalist - -that he had plotted to prevent Milosevic's arrest. Curiously, bearing in mind Politika's printing deadlines, the front page carrying this revelation was in print even before the 'police' night attack on Milosevic's villa was called off.
Throughout Friday night, high officials of the Serbian regime were conspicuously "unaware" of what was going on. Justice Minister Vladan Batic claimed to have no knowledge of events, while Prime Minister Djindjic, contacted at his home, claimed to be watching Gladiator with his son. Yet later on Saturday the official version claimed that the officials had tried to serve the arrest warrant on Milosevic on Friday afternoon or evening and that, following his refusal to accept it, they were obliged to call in police reinforcements to serve it by force.
By Saturday morning the Serbian authorities were not denying full knowledge of the facts. Interior Minister Dusan Mihajlovic held a press conference in which he gave a detailed account of the official version, confirming the existence of the arrest warrant and the intention to serve it and arrest Milosevic. However, highlighting the danger posed by Vucinic and his "drunken group", Mihajlovic announced that the police would move in when it was certain that bloodshed would be averted. Coupled with the alleged claim that "Milosevic would not give himself up alive" - which originated from the commander who visited the villa the previous night - tension was running high.
At this stage, the stakes again became political. The Politika article had served its purpose. The VJ denied that it had engaged in any obstruction, but Federal President Kostunica had been brought out in the open. With the case coming into worldwide focus, he had no manoeuvring space to prevent Milosevic's arrest now that the existence of a duly issued court warrant on embezzlement and abuse of power charges had been revealed.
A long - and by unconfirmed accounts tense - meeting of the highest officials of both governments followed. During that meeting Kostunica finally accepted Milosevic's arrest as inevitable and unavoidable. The rest was simply a technical matter. At 04.25 hrs on the morning of Sunday 1 April, one suspected embezzler of $175 million of state funds and abuser of his official position - Slobodan Milosevic, lawyer, aged 59, former president of Serbia and Yugoslavia - was arrested and driven from his villa to prison. In the afternoon of the same day he pleaded not guilty and was officially ordered to be kept in custody for 30 days pending official charges. Only then did he receive his first visitor and the suspected prime motivating force behind his actions: his wife Mirjana Markovic.
Claims made after the arrest on Sunday refer to long negotiations with Milosevic over his arrest, including guarantees that he would not be turned over to the ICTY. While that is unlikely to happen immediately -or, rather, as long as the Serbs can avoid it - any such guarantee would not carry much weight. The whole affair is a clear victory for Djindic's pragmatism over Kostunica's 'patriotism', and there is little doubt that the pragmatic approach will justify turning Milosevic over to a UN-founded court in exchange for tangible benefits for the country. This may come regardless of what Kostunica's legal objections may be at the time - provided he survives in a top political role by that point; the possibility of Montenegro leaving the Yugoslav federation that it by now only nominally belongs to is becoming increasingly probable, and the dissolution of the federal state would leave Kostunica, whom the international community is finding increasingly hard to digest, without a job. It is officially known that the government in Belgrade is preparing a bill that will institutionalise the FRY's co-operation with the ICTY, and even with all the foot-dragging expected this will be in place as law within months, thus removing Kostunica's last petty legalistic objection to delivering any indictees to the Hague.
More details will certainly emerge in the time to come, possibly even including the dirty linen. However, two things are certain: firstly that Milosevic's arrest is Djindjic's first important victory of the long-expected but carefully avoided show-down between the two new strong men of Belgrade. It is now just a question of time when that unavoidable head-on clash will emerge fully into the open. The second certainly is that the Milosevic story, which started as a great national and patriotic epic, is ending as a farce - and not just because the former object of mass adoration has been reduced to an inmate of a drab jail whose "special status" is reflected in his cell having hot and cold water, but no TV set. More elements of farce were provided by the fact that the only shots fired during the arrest of the man who in 1989 brought a million Serbs to near ecstasy in an open field in Kosovo by telling them that "armed battles [standing before Serbs] are not excluded" were made by his daughter Marija, a notorious gun aficionado. Allegedly "in an emotionally disturbed state", according to an official statement, she fired them in the direction of the government's main negotiator of Milosevic's peaceful arrest: one Cedomir 'Ceda' Jovanovic, a former student protester and now the representative of the new power in Serbia.