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Iran heading towards conflict

11 November 2004

Iran heading towards conflict

The risk of a confrontation between Iran and the international community is set to escalate as it becomes likely that the Islamic Republic will soon possess its own nuclear weapon. JID's nuclear expert reviews the evidence and warns of a hardening attitude in Washington.

Back in September 2004, the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) reported that Iran was intending to convert 37 tonnes of milled uranium oxide ('yellowcake') into uranium hexafluoride, the 'feed' material for centrifuges that gets made into highly enriched uranium (HEU). This is viewed to be too small a quantity for a civilian programme but would provide enough material for around five nuclear weapons.

In undertaking the yellowcake conversion, Iran is going further in breaching the arrangement it made with the EU in October 2003 when it announced that it would suspend enrichment activities, shortly after which it decided to resume assembling centrifuges. Amid calls by the US to refer Iran to the UN Security Council, the EU member states have opted to allow Iran a final opportunity to come to a negotiated solution before supporting Washington's demands for tough sanctions.

The IAEA's resolution called on Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities immediately and reconsider its decision to construct a heavy-water research reactor at Arak. Tehran has insisted that the Arak reactor would be used solely for research and the production of radioisotopes for medical and industrial purposes. Experts point out that such a reactor would also provide the means to produce plutonium without the need to enrich uranium.

In June 2004, Iran cut the IAEA seals on its existing centrifuge components and began assembling centrifuges from existing component stock. Other outstanding issues involve the origin of uranium contamination found at various locations; the completeness of Iran's declaration about the acquisition of advanced P2 gas centrifuges; establishing that undeclared enrichment has not taken place at other locations and confirming that no undeclared HEU has already been imported.

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