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Rogue scientists and WMD
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23
September 2004
Rogue scientists and WMD
A disturbing element in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is the covert activities of so-called 'rogue scientists' and the trading by rogue companies in WMD-related equipment and technologies, particularly those with dual-use applications.
The recent disclosure that South Korean government scientists conducted experiments in 2000 to enrich small amounts of uranium has highlighted the continuing problems over some experts operating within the nuclear sector. According to the South Korean government, the experiment was an "isolated academic activity" conducted "exclusively by a few scientists." If this statement is to be accepted at face value, the international community is being asked to believe Seoul's claim that these experiments were conducted without official approval.
If so, the admission highlights the problem of covert WMD programmes, both large and small. When such activities come to light, the scientists' employers - usually governments - have to explain the projects as having been unauthorised.
The South Korean experiments involved the use of laser isotope separation on 0.2 grammes of uranium and other materials such as gadolinium, thallium and samarium. There is little commercial value in laser isotope separation, suggesting that there may have been military motives behind the experiments.
Also, the US claims that military research 'entities' have previously conducted missile-related research activities that were not necessarily backed by Seoul. Such experiments are likely to have been conducted because of concerns over North Korea's possession of long-range ballistic missile technology.
The very nature of WMD work is often so secretive that even some government agencies may be genuinely unaware of what projects their scientists may be involved in. This could certainly be the case in some biological weapons research activities, which can be undertaken using small amounts of the raw materials needed and relatively small-scale facilities and equipment.
When it comes to international proliferation, scientists are unlikely to be operating in isolation. 'Rogue companies' may supply countries of concern with WMD-related items contrary to official government policies. The worldwide nuclear equipment trading network masterminded by the ultimate 'rogue scientist', Abdul Qadeer Khan, widely regarded as the 'father' of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, was a classic example.
The 'Khan network' included suppliers and middlemen from several countries, including Pakistan, Dubai, Japan, and Malaysia, but also Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the UK. States of concern - Libya, Iran and North Korea - were the recipients of a range of components to enrich uranium, as well as blueprints and expertise. Khan used his experience and wide contact base from working at the European enrichment consortium, URENCO, to build up the network of suppliers.
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