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The Iraq blame game: Israel
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| 19 February 2004 |
As the US and Britain prepare for independent inquiries into their intelligence services' performance prior to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, a special panel of Israel's parliament, the Knesset, is putting the final touches to a report on whether their country's intelligence services had deliberately overstated Saddam Hussein's military capabilities.
Most of the findings of the lengthy probe are expected to be classified, but sources close to the proceedings have indicated that the report will note "serious shortcomings" in Israeli intelligence gathering, especially in countries such as Iraq beyond the country's immediate neighbours. Some intelligence analysts regard these flaws as part of the lingering fallout from the near-disaster of the 1973 Middle East war that has haunted Israel for the last three decades.
Amid great secrecy and considerable opposition from senior figures in the defence and intelligence establishments, the chairman of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, Yuval Steinitz of the Likud Party, launched an investigation seven months before US President George W Bush was pressured into appointing a committee to investigate why US intelligence agencies bungled their assessment of Saddam's capabilities. The investigation has held 50 sessions and some 70 witnesses have testified before it. They include Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz, Israel Defence Force (IDF) chief of staff Lieutenant-General Moshe Yaalon, Military Intelligence director Maj Gen Aharon Zeevi, Mossad director Meir Dagan and Shin Bet chief Avi Dichter.
Steinitz insists that the investigative committee, which he heads, is essential because "there has been no committee that has seriously investigated the intelligence services" since the commission set up after the 1973 war under the president of the supreme court, Shimon Agranat. The final report, published on 30 January 1975, was scathing in its criticism of the inefficiency of Israeli Military Intelligence, known by the Hebrew acronym Aman. The main recommendation was a move to break Aman's monopoly on the evaluation of intelligence and to introduce "pluralism in the various types of intelligence evaluations".
With the perceived post-Cold War threats to Israel changing once again, following 11 September 2001 and the US-led regime changes in Iraq and Afghanistan, and with Iran in particular being seen as a growing danger to Israel's security, such imperfections in the intelligence establishment are causing considerable concern.
Other allegations have been surfacing in the US that the ad hoc intelligence review cell made up of pro-Israel neo-conservative hawks within the Bush administration, overseen by undersecretary for defence policy Douglas Feith, prior to the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 co-operated with Israel in pushing for the war against Saddam. The entire team involved in the Office of Special Plans (OSP) championed by US vice-president Dick Cheney were political appointees.
The OSP operated outside inter-agency channels and has been accused of doctoring intelligence assessments on Iraq presented to the White House, while other neo-cons have pressured the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to tailor its analyses to buttress the findings presented by the OSP.
Domestic critics of Israel's intelligence establishment contend that the data it provided to the US to enhance their pre-war assessment of Saddam's WMD programmes - pointing to a threat that now appears not to have existed - has damaged both many Israelis' trust in their intelligence establishment and its credibility in the eyes of Israel's allies and friends.
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