Non-Subscriber Extract
Iraq dossier fiasco rolls on
- Article Tools
| 12 June 2003 |
Mounting criticism of two dossiers on Iraq published by the British government before the US-led invasion has been reflected in the latest Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) annual report. There are concerns that British intelligence service sources may reveal the extent of alleged political influence during the preparation of the dossiers, which played a key role in boosting public support for action against Iraq.
The committee's findings support JID's investigation into the row surrounding the second dossier, which focused on Saddam Hussein's security apparatus and human rights abuses (see JID 14 February 2003). As we observed at the time: "It is important to note that - at least in its final form - the Iraq dossier was assembled not by intelligence service operatives, but by civil servants working in the British government's media department and the Foreign Office."
Proof that JID's information on the dossier was accurate is found in the ISC report, which confirms that "although the document did contain some intelligence-derived material it was not clearly attributed or highlighted amongst the other material, nor was it checked with the Agency providing the intelligence or cleared by the JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee] prior to publication".
In other words, the February 2003 dossier - referred to as being "exquisitely detailed" by US Secretary of State Colin Powell - was more or less a government-edited production, rather than the work of any of the intelligence services. However, when allegations of plagiarism were made shortly after the dossier was published, the credibility of the British intelligence services was seriously questioned.
The ISC has now gone some way towards absolving Britain's intelligence agencies from blame in this fiasco, although the committee's report doesn't answer the equally important question of who actually sanctioned the so-called 'dodgy dossier' and then failed to get it checked or approved by the JIC.
However, far more serious concerns are raised by the credibility of the first dossier, which dealt with Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction capability. This document contained the now infamous claim - which British prime minister Tony Blair continues to endorse - that Saddam's illicit weapons of mass destruction could be made ready in "45 minutes". It also contained a whole section on claims concerning Iraq's supposed efforts to resurrect its nuclear weapons programme - allegations which were based, in part, on documents since exposed as forgeries.
According to the ISC report, the weapons of mass destruction dossier was "assembled by the Assessments staff, endorsed by the JIC and issued by the prime minister". In this case, the responsibility appears very clear: the security services and the political leadership all played key roles in preparing and publishing the first dossier.
This is vitally important because if investigations on the ground in Iraq eventually draw a blank in the hunt for the elusive weapons, the intelligence services will be able to pass the ultimate responsibility on to the British government and specifically to the prime minister himself.
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