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Al Qaeda: one year on
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| 05 September 2002 |
As the first anniversary of the terrorist attacks against the US approaches, there has been the predictable round of media features focusing on the successes and failures of the 'war against terrorism'. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that most of the initial 'war aims' have not been achieved. JID investigates why.
Perhaps the first and foremost mistake in the immediate aftermath of 11 September was to personalise the conflict. By making Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden the main target, anything short of a confirmed death or a living captive was doomed to fall short of popular expectation.
The second error – and this may prove even more costly in the longer term – was to assume that a military victory over the Taliban regime in Afghanistan would inflict severe damage on Al-Qaeda's operational capability. In fact, although the Taliban did provide invaluable political patronage for Bin Laden and his network, Al-Qaeda was never truly dependent on the Taliban.
Although it is true that the ousting of the Taliban has certainly ended the training of Al-Qaeda's foot-soldiers in Afghanistan – and this is no small achievement – what has not been stopped is the group's ability to raise funds or operate its international network of sleeper cells and safe houses. In fact, in the view of many within the Western intelligence community, Al-Qaeda is probably stronger now than it was before 11 September.
The reasons for this are complex, but key factors include the enormous growth in grassroots support for the group throughout much of the Islamic world.
Repeated attempts by leading Western politicians to portray the militants as a tiny faction without mainstream support is admitted privately to be more reflective of a general concern to avoid giving the impression that the 'war against terrorism' is actually a 'war against Islam'.
Of course, it is undeniable that a great many Muslims (particularly those living in the West) were genuinely horrified by events of 11 September. However, it is also impossible to suppress the fact that Al-Qaeda and its leader enjoy widespread popular support throughout the Middle East. What the group has managed to do, with notable success, is to combine powerful anti-Western sentiment with proof that it has the capability of striking at the heart of the US. At a time when Washington is seen as Israel's key ally, it has been very easy for Al-Qaeda to present itself as the Islamic world's means of striking back against unequal forces. The West underestimates the attraction of Al-Qaeda's propaganda message to many Muslims at its peril.
Another key political mistake has been to focus on secondary distractions, such as the ‘axis of evil’, while soft-peddling on the principal sponsors of Al-Qaeda: Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The unpalatable truth is that these two ‘allies’ of the West have played an undeniable role in the growth of Bin Laden's group into an international terrorist network.
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