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Musharraf's game plan
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| 16 March 2001 |
Will Pakistan's Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf keep his promise to follow the Supreme Court's directive to restore civilian rule in the country by October 2002? Does he have a game plan for the future? After 17 months of dismal performance by the military regime in practically every field, these questions have become vitally important.
Recent developments in Pakistan's political and military circles indicate that the general may yet follow in the footsteps of his predecessors, General Zia-ul-Haq and Field Marshal Ayub Khan, by remaining in power. It is not without significance that he has started to give vague hints in this direction, expressing his readiness to play a role in the future governance of the country. At present, instead of focusing on the restoration of democracy, Musharraf is trying to consolidate his position in the emerging power equation in Pakistan.
Musharraf also appears determined to get rid of major political figures in the country who might challenge his position in the near future. This policy has become apparent with the military regime amending the Political Parties Act of 1962 in order to oust, convict and disqualify rival politicians. With ousted premier Nawaz Sharif (as well as Benazir Bhutto and Altaf Hussain) already in exile, the general has bought himself both more time and space for political manoeuvring.
JID has been informed by reliable sources that, as part of his long-term strategy, General Musharraf is planning to succeed Rafiq Tarar as the next President of Pakistan. It has been argued that this would not only ensure continuity of the policies initiated by the military regime, but would also formalise the army's role in the future government, as well as giving the military rulers protection from any future political action against them by a successor government.
Furthermore, independent intelligence reports suggest that Musharraf is considering amending the constitution to assume more presidential power. There are already indications that the Eighth Amendment of the constitution - which gives discretionary powers to the President to dismiss the government and dissolve the National Assembly - might be revived in a modified form. The Supreme Court has allowed the military regime to make constitutional amendments, even though they still require final ratification by the National Assembly.
The need to achieve formal approval for the constitutional amendments has necessitated a search for a political partner for the military regime. Like his predecessors Ayub and Zia, Musharraf has opted to cultivate the dissident faction of the Pakistan Muslim League for this purpose. It was against this background that the military regime helped the dissidents to take over by force the Pakistan Muslim League's offices in Islamabad and Lahore.
There is a little doubt that the politicians would be playing the role of a junior partner in a future political-military alliance. Musharraf's devolution plan is part of the overall strategy to create an obedient political class. The military regime expects that that the new leadership emerging from local elections would provide much-needed political support, which could also be utilised for wider political roles. This is the tried and tested method used by both Ayub and Zia, and now another general seems set to follow it.
Pacifying the West
Simultaneously, Musharraf is trying to get international backing for both himself and for his regime by attempting to promote the view that should he fail, the consequence could be a Taliban-style revolution in Pakistan with disastrous consequences for Western interests in the region. To allay Western concerns, the military regime has broken off some of its links with the Taliban leadership, closed a number of dubious training camps on the border with Afghanistan, and restricted the activities of the jihadi organisations in Pakistan.
Similarly, by making positive moves towards achieving a solution to the Kashmir problem, Musharraf is further trying to improve his image before the rest of the world. He is well aware of the fact that the West would be more likely to tolerate his regime in Islamabad if it could contribute to the peace process in Kashmir.
Moreover, by gradually consolidating his control over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, the general has enhanced his position in terms both of international bargaining and of fighting off his opponents within Pakistan.
As the military regime enters into the second half of the time scale set by the Supreme Court to restore democracy, Musharraf's end game is beginning to unfold. If everything goes according to plan, based on past experience and recent developments, the general may manage to reinvent himself as a civilian ruler, just like Pakistan's previous military dictators. How long he can survive may be a very different matter.