Non-Subscriber Extract
Life after death - scenarios for a post-Castro Cuba
05 June 2007
By Anna Gilmour
Reports predicting Fidel Castro's death have been greatly exaggerated. Having been the dominant figure in Cuban political life for 47 years, Castro temporarily stepped down from his position as head of state in July 2006 following a serious operation. However, in April 2007, photographs showing Fidel meeting a Chinese delegation demonstrated his return to official business.
For many years, Castro's domestic and international opponents have predicted that his death would exacerbate the fault lines in his administration's one-party, quasi-communist regime, with popular uprisings leading to the overthrow of Cuba's current political system. In the event, such hopes have proven unfounded in the 11 months since Castro's temporary abdication, as it has become evident that a clearly defined and well-prepared succession plan is in place.
Castro transferred power to his brother and long-designated successor Raúl, supported by a team of six Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) stalwarts. The transition has been remarkably smooth; no significant protests have taken place and the new administration has taken pains to stress its political and policy continuity with Fidel's style of government. In this it has been helped by the fact that Fidel, while not now officially head of state, continues to play a leading role in state propaganda. Newspaper reports and video footage documenting his recovery from surgery are designed to reassure Cubans that their long-term leader is still playing a role in the country's politics and may even return to power.
However, Fidel's long convalescence and the official transfer of power to Raúl have both served to illustrate the fact that the 80-year-old leader's reign as Cuba's dominant political character is drawing to an end. Even as he takes up some of his former duties again, the transition to a post-Fidel Cuba is effectively already under way. Fidel has been fortunate in that he has been able to stage-manage this transition in part while he is still alive, minimising the disruption to the political system. However, his death will test the resilience of the 48-year-old revolutionary state and the effectiveness of the transition plans already put into action.
Cuba enjoys a stable political system with few threats to the status quo. The country's one-party state is controlled by the CPC, which has a highly developed system of organisation. Party presence in even small villages ensures that most Cubans are involved with the party system to some extent, while particular efforts are made to involve young people in the Union of Young Communists (La Union de Jovenes Comunistas: UJC). The CPC itself has a strong organisation independent of Castro and is widely viewed as capable of maintaining Cuba's political system following his death.
Despite the 'cult of personality' surrounding Fidel, the party has taken pains domestically to ensure that other figures are well known, giving them political legitimacy. One of the most well known is Raúl, whose exploits in the 1959 revolution and long-term leadership of the Cuban military have made him an established political figure, albeit in his brother's shadow. Following Raúl's assumption of power in August 2006, a political campaign to improve his profile has concentrated on emphasising his revolutionary past and his skills at governance. Raúl has not been a particularly popular figure in the past, but his relationship with Fidel and his impeccable revolutionary credentials make him a credible figure to bridge the gulf between the Fidel era and the new administration.
Dissent in Cuba is officially forbidden, but several organisations do exist, notably the Varela Project and the Ladies in White. These have achieved little, and the rationale for the government's continued tolerance of their existence is that these fora make it easier to keep track of dissident action. Given that many dissidents are imprisoned indefinitely, few people are willing to act openly against the government. However, this reluctance means that it is difficult to assess the level of dissent with certainty, and the existence of a significant underground opposition movement waiting to emerge after the death of Fidel cannot be ruled out.
Dissatisfaction with the current system is widespread, particularly in the economic domain. However, national pride in the achievements of the revolution and antagonism to US interference remain a strong uniting force. While support for the system itself is more tolerance than active support, there are insufficient triggers to spark a widespread demand for change.