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The militarisation of Iran's politics
24 June 2008
With Iran facing formidable challenges in its nuclear stand-off with the West, and given the internal pressures for political and economic reforms, the political leadership of the Islamic Republic is increasingly relying on the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) to maintain power.
Having chosen the path of defiance in relation to the West and repression of domestic unease, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei considers the IRGC officer class more apt at crisis management both at home and abroad than the bureaucratic leftovers from the presidencies of Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005).
This trend is reflected in the composition of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s government, appointments of provincial governors and the results of the 14 March 2008 parliamentary elections. Without Khamenei's blessing, who is the ultimate religious and political authority, this militirisation of politics could not have occurred, at least not at this pace.
Far from being an innovation, the IRGC's presence in the Ahmadinejad government continues a constant in the Islamic Republic's politics, in which the ideological officer corps has been represented in all but the shortlived transitional government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan (February-November 1979). Still, the number of former IRGC members seems to have reached a new peak during the Ahmadinejad presidency. Besides Ahmadinejad, nine out of his 21 cabinet ministers all come from the IRGC.
The Supreme Leader's sole reliance on the IRGC would make Ayatollah Khamenei a prisoner of his own guard in the longer term which could, therefore, pave the way for a military dictatorship to replace the theocratic regime.