Non-Subscriber Extract
Terrorists on tour
03 April 2008
A man in his early twenties is walking through London, mingling with the crowds. He is carrying a video camera and spends time filming the Houses of Parliament, Downing Street and the front of New Scotland Yard.
Is he a tourist? Or is he a terrorist engaged in hostile reconnaissance of potential targets? And how can we tell the difference? These types of questions are increasingly being faced by UK police officers.
Most successful terrorist operations begin with extensive planning. The plans for the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States started at least three years before the hijackings took place. The 7 July 2005 London bombers carried out dummy runs to London prior to the attack.
An essential element of the planning process is gathering detailed reconnaissance and intelligence about a target: its defences, vulnerabilities, and patterns of daily activity. The aim is to gather all the information possible concerning a particular target so the data can help create a precise plan of action that will increase the terrorists' likelihood for success.
How can frontline police officers spot 'hostile' recording and so identify and hopefully disrupt a terrorist operation at an early stage, and how can they tell real hostile reconnaissance from a benign piece of footage?
According to the US Department of Homeland Security, reconnaissance activities by terrorists will normally have the following general characteristics as they attempt to survey and probe potential targets:
- unusual or prolonged interest in security measures or personnel, entry points or access controls or perimeter barriers such as fences or walls
- unusual behaviour such as staring at or quickly looking away from personnel or vehicles entering or leaving designated facilities or parking areas
- observation of security reaction drills or procedures
- foot surveillance involving two or three individuals working together
- mobile surveillance using bicycles, scooters, motorcycles, cars, trucks, sport utility vehicles, limousines, boats or small aircraft
- prolonged static surveillance using operatives disguised as food or flower vendors, news agents or street sweepers not previously seen in the area
- discreet use of still cameras, video recorders or note taking at non-tourist locations
- use of multiple sets of clothing and identification or the use of sketching materials (such as paper or pencils)
- questioning of security or facility personnel.
In assessing whether a video is hostile reconnaissance, investigating officers need to ask whether the footage is looking at these types of features.
One key question investigators will need to consider is how useful the footage would be to a terrorist who wanted to carry out an attack. It is vital to consider whether there is enough detail and material for the footage to be really helpful to a terrorist planner.
Ambiguous footage should always be treated with caution. Juries will examine such footage closely and alternative interpretations of ambiguous images will be provided by defence counsel. Helping officers to develop a greater understanding of how terrorist reconnaissance is carried out, and what the end product looks like, is an important first step.
Image: Cameras, videos and even mobile phones are often used in the reconnaissance stage of a terrorist operation