Non-Subscriber Extract
Brazil's nuclear potential
22 January 2008
Alongside Brazil's growing economic and political clout, the revival of its nuclear ambitions has gone largely unnoticed. While Brazilian nuclear intentions are not military in nature, the development of its civilian programmes could be motivated partly by political and commercial considerations.
Brazil's technical expertise is improving rapidly, following decades of inactivity. In December 2007, Mohamed El Baradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), visited the first state-owned uranium enrichment plant at Resende, 140 km northwest of Rio de Janeiro. This appeared to end the controversy generated by Brazil's ongoing refusal to sign the Additional Protocol authorising spot inspections by the IAEA. Brazil claimed it was concerned about potential industrial espionage regarding its claimed technically superior electromagnetic centrifuges - which Brazil was keen to claim as an indication of its growing technical prowess, although the technology was developed more than a decade ago with foreign assistance.
Despite developing its uranium enrichment programme, successive governments have denied potential military applications. Brazil's military government had a covert programme in place during the late 1970s and 1980s attempting to acquire nuclear weapons capability. However, this programme was officially cancelled after the return to civilian rule and the country's new constitution restricted nuclear activities to peaceful uses. Yet potential capability remains; statements made since 2002 by current President Luiz In‡cio Lula da Silva, Science and Technology Minister Roberto Amaral, and other Brazilian government and military officials have reinforced the belief of many observers that Brazil's civilian nuclear energy and naval propulsion programmes could be quickly diverted to acquire weapons-grade capabilities in the unlikely event of a change in government nuclear policy.