Non-Subscriber Extract
Executive Overview: Jane's Explosive Ordnance Disposal
03 April 2008
Most people understand that all ammunition is prone to failure. However, the Oslo Process (seeking to ban cluster munitions that cause "'unacceptable harm to civilians") has highlighted a far more important point: that ammunition rarely performs as well during operations as it does in testing. In other words, ammunition trials consistently give an inaccurate indication of field reliability.
Failure rates vary wildly between different types of ordnance, and even between different lots of the same ammunition. The first page of statistics from ammunition testing at the Hjerkinn range in Norway illustrates the point: out of 50 types of projectile between 20 mm and 105 mm, 17 had failure rates above 8 per cent, of which seven were at 20 per cent or more. Yet, historically, this has been a secondary consideration. The operator's prime requirement has simply been the ability to manufacture and deploy ammunition fast enough to sustain the operational tempo.
The outrage of post-conflict civilian casualties was, for many years, dismissed as unavoidable 'collateral damage'. Also overlooked was the long-term denial of land and the danger to friendly forces - at least until the extent of the problem became more widely known. The unwanted consequences were considered to be part of the price of success and easily ignored, since the cost was generally born by far-away populations with little international influence.
Laos, for example, was subjected to the heaviest cluster munition bombardments in history, and is still suffering casualties on a routine basis, some 40 years after the event. But in recent interventions, where winning campaigns also demands winning hearts and minds, the attitude towards Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) has shifted noticeably. 'Peacemaking' interventions are intended to surgically remove hostile factions from the local population, so civilian casualties inflicted by friendly forces' unexploded ordnance can undo months of good work in the milliseconds following detonation.
The Oslo Process has given 'victim nations' and individuals a forum in which to broadcast their situation, and the results are sobering. Users of cluster munitions are being forced to confront the graphic consequences of their actions and - even where they can justify their use - explain why their weapons performed so poorly. In many cases the intentions have been honourable, but misleading test results have undermined sound policy and doctrine.
Image: An unexploded bomb in Baghdad. While the Oslo Process has highlighted the problem, it is not just cluster munitions that have unacceptably high failure rates (Colin King)