Non-Subscriber Extract
Executive Overview: Jane's Underwater Security Systems and Technology
22 January 2008
In recent years the significant challenges posed by threats to the security of harbour installations, offshore structures and merchant shipping, as well as the potential costs, has started to be fully understood by those responsible for protecting them. The threat is not just from terrorist attack, as weapons, drugs and even people may be smuggled across borders. In September 2000, a drug smuggling submarine was discovered in Bogot‡ that would have been capable of carrying 150 to 200 tons of cargo plus 12 crew members, and submersibles are regularly used by smugglers to evade patrols. This has led to the Colombian Navy's acquisition of two Type 209 submarines to aid them in the fight against narcotics smuggling. In August 2006 another submarine, possibly abandoned after an abortive test-run, was found drifting off Spain, showing that this is indeed a growing problem and that it is apparently relatively easy to construct a small manned submarine or semi-submersible with only basic materials and skills. Since 2005, Colombia has captured 11 home-made submarines constructed from glass fibre.
For many years much emphasis has been placed on protecting airports and aircraft, but relatively little attention has been paid to shipping terminals and harbour installations. Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, the public has demanded protection from terrorist attack on aircraft; however, airports are far more controllable than seaports, and once an aircraft has taken off it is relatively safe, independent of the airport. Merchant shipping, however, is constantly vulnerable to many forms of attack, and the most difficult to defend against is the threat from below.
The terrorist threat extends beyond the harbour, to ships at sea and offshore platforms, especially infrastructure related to the oil and gas industry. In this age of asymmetric warfare the terrorists can carry out their task with very basic technology. Simple diving equipment and a crude limpet mine could cripple a cruise liner, oil tanker or even warship when alongside. With the possibility that the attacker may be a suicide bomber, the need for escape is eradicated, making it even harder for defenders to prevent attacks. The problems faced by port and harbour authorities are obvious, as they have to supervise large expanses of water, possibly full of inlets, estuaries and slipways. Constant civilian traffic from small sailing dinghys to large fishing trawlers and merchantmen make for a very busy and noisy acoustic environment, and one difficult to supervise and regulate.
But despite the political ramifications of the sinking of a large oil tanker or cruise liner, the budget allocated to their security appears to relatively low compared to that of passenger air travel - all the more alarming considering the scope of the damage that could be done by terrorists to a nation's infrastructure. This fear is also not without precedent. It has been widely reported that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) have destroyed a number of Sri Lankan minor war vessels with SCUBA-equipped divers carrying improvised limpet mines containing around 50 kg of explosives. Defence of harbours in wartime has always been a priority, using anti-torpedo and submarine nets, shore batteries, sonar buoys and other acoustic sensors, but in peacetime this would prove to be a costly and highly inconvenient form of defence, especially with the weight of traffic experienced by modern day ports. As a result, detection and prevention would need to be almost entirely sensors-based rather than utilising physical barriers. The problem with this, however, is the time lag between picking up a contact, identifying it, designating it as a threat, and responding to that threat with a hard kill option before the target can complete its mission. This is where new advances in harbour protection may have the potential to swing the balance in the defender's favour. Of course, the requirement to survey the underwater environment goes beyond the need to identify and track objects moving through the water, but also to determine unidentified objects that may have been attached to ships' hulls, jetties, wharves, piers and even the seabed.
Image: Container ship entering Cape Town Container Port, South Africa (Jane's/Patrick Allen)