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Kosovo: NATO strikes blunt Yugoslav air defences
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NATO
strikes blunt Yugoslav air defences
The following appraisal of Yugoslav air defences is extracted from a longer feature - "NATO strikes blunt Yugoslav air defences" by Seymour Johnson, carried in the April issue of Jane's Missiles and Rockets.
Responsibility for the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) is split between the Yugoslav Air and Protective Defence force (JRV i PO) - a largely volunteer force - and the army (VJ). The JRV i PVO is responsible for the chain of early-warning radars and the network of command, control, and communications equipment dispersed at sites around the country; fighter aviation; and the bulk of heavy and medium SAMs (including fixed sites). The army controls some mobile medium SAMs, associated sensors and mobile command units; and organic air-defence assets including most short-range and man-portable missile systems, plus self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). The whole system is well netted together (including fibre-optic links) and has a degree of redundancy and 'graceful degradation'. Some of the early-warning radars and SAM sites are protected from anti-radiation missiles by the use of locally produced electronic decoys. The best-defended sites are those with strategic military value, including government, army, and security police headquarters; the industrial infrastructure; major population centres; plus ports and airfields.
The JRV i PO controls the following ground-based air-defence forces, which were upgraded in the mid-1970s. Some are reported to have received further upgrades, most recently last year. At the outset of hostilities, fixed SAM sites included eight battalions of Soviet S-75M Volkov (SA-2F) with 60 launchers, and 15 battalions of S-125 Pechora M (SA-3B) again with 60 (mostly quad) launchers. At least a proportion of the 'Low-Blow' target-engagement radars associated with the SA-3 system are equipped with a 25Km range TV camera which provides the fire-control team with the same data as would be available from the radar. These TV trackers were added as part of continuing local improvements by Fotona, a formerly Yugoslav company based in what is now the Republic of Slovenia.
There have been reports of unspecified recent upgrades carried out to the JRV i PO S-125 systems but this cannot be confirmed. Russia, China, Poland and Ukraine all offer improvement packages for the system, while a Yugoslav upgrade and overhaul package incorporating digital sub-systems including digital MTI (moving target indication) is marketed for export by Yugoimport-SDPR. The FRY has some limited autonomous capability in the field of defence electronics (including radar and guidance systems), electro-optics and rocket propulsion - a capability which NATO has targeted during the recent strikes.
The operational
status of the Soviet S-75M Volkov (SA-2F) systems is unclear. One source
claims that that prior to the threat of hostilities these were in the
process of being retired or relegated to a training role. The funding
needed for a digital subsystems upgrade (such as the Russian 'Defence
Systems' Volga-M package would have placed too great a strain on scarce
operating and maintenance
resources.
At the Defendory '98 exhibition, Yugoimport-SDPR (Y-SDPR) promoted its upgrade for the S-75 which included digital MTI, a logarithmic receiver and improved control and recording equipment. It was unclear from the company's literature whether or not it had been funded by the FRY defence ministry to carry out this particular upgrade work on JRV i PO S-75 systems, but there was a clear implication that the company had had experience of service life extension work on the S-75s and had investigated the cost-effectiveness of a digital upgrade for FRY systems.
On the eve of hostilities the equivalent of a reinforced SA-6/SA-11 regiment was believed to be in Kosovo, with 24 transporter/erector/launchers (TELs) deployed at six locations. While the local terrain favours concealment of mobile systems it also complicates their movement and makes siting for optimum coverage problematic. According to a Russian industry source, the JRV i PO and the VJ deployed between them 68 SA-6 three-round TELs at the outset of hostilities together with appropriate sensor and support vehicles. Additionally the Serbs either acquired (or acquired the ability to produce) new warheads, fuzes, sensors (in the form of TV optical trackers and new radar modes) and other electronics (including a digital MTI system and a new continuous wave [CW] transmitter) for an undetermined number of their SA-6 missiles. Against a target of certain specified characteristics this reportedly extended the maximum effective engagement range from 20 to 24km, doubled the engagement ceiling to 14km, reduced minimum target altitude from 100m to 30m and halved the radius of the inner dead-zone. Other improvements covered increasing the clutter rejection factor, improving ECCM capability and survivability in a lethal SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) environment, and increasing reliability. Some, if not all, of the SA-6 systems now incorporate TV optical trackers, as do some S-125 systems.
Since Yugoimport-SDPR has marketed improvement packages for the SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 which includes a thermal imager and laser rangefinder, both boresighted with the TV tracker to allow range measurement with passive tracking at night and in poor weather, it would be very surprising if this modification had not been incorporated on as many systems as possible once the threat of NATO air strikes had emerged.
US intelligence sources now say that a very few early-model S-300PT (SA-10) SAM systems had been delivered by Russia before the arms embargo took effect, although a Russian industry source disputes this. In any event their operational status appears doubtful, although Rosvoorouzhenie has stated publicly that it could immediately supply the FRY with S-300PM/PMU systems if the Russian government gave the go-ahead.
Both the 9M38 Buk (SA-11) and the 9M330 Tor/9K331 Tor-M-1(SA-15) systems have been shown on Yugoslav TV, apparently operating in the local countryside. Although there has been independent confirmation of small numbers of the 9M38 Buk being in the JRV i PO inventory, the possibility of an elaborate FRY Government-sponsored 'disinformation' operation cannot be ruled out, particularly over the Tor system. If either weapon is in Yugoslav service, it is likely that the numbers actually deployed may only run to single figures. Transfers from the air-defence forces of sympathetic republics within the CIS would be the most likely source of supply. Some sources claim that the S-200D Angara (SA-5 'Gammon') long-range surface to air missile is deployed around Belgrade. This seems unlikely.
As the weather clears and more battlefield air interdiction missions are flown over Kosovo, the organic air-defence systems fielded by the army (VJ) and interior ministry police (MUP) will take on a greater importance. These include some 9M33M Osa-AK (SA-8b), 130 9K31 Strela 1 (SA-9), plus numerous examples of the SAVA (S-10 M2J) local modification of Strela 10M, some 9K35 Strela 10M (SA-13), plus the Tor systems mentioned above.
In early October 1998, a number of sources reported that Russia had supplied Serbia with additional air-defence equipment, in violation of the arms embargo. According to these reports, a small number of 2S6M Tunguska gun/SAM (Ghs-6-30K 30mm/9M311) tracked air defence vehicles were transferred illegally to VJ organic air-defence units.
Although intelligence
sources confirm that this was not an official sale carried out with the
overt approval of the Russian Government, Jane's Missiles and Rockets
understands that there is evidence to suggest that both hardware and know-how
may have changed hands. A source familiar with the often unauthorised
and unexplained movement of conventional armaments from and within the
republics of the Former
Soviet Union (FSU) notes that: "such are the levels of poverty and
corruption within the armed and security forces of the FSU, the economic
anxiety and uncertainty within the defence industries, the interests and
influence of organised crime so pervasive, and the levels of profit from
such a 'deal' so lucrative, that they make such transactions such as this
an increasing and inevitable fact of life within the CIS."
The majority of the Yugoslav self-propelled SHORADS (short-range air-defence systems) are likely to be employed in support of ground operations in and around Kosovo. They will be supplemented by man-portable air-defence (MANPAD) missile systems including approximately 300 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16) and Strela 3 (SA-14) and over 500 SA-7 variants. The latter include the locally produced Yugoimport-SDPR Strela 2M/A which features the largest warhead of any Strela/Igla variant.
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