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The KLA: braced to defend and control
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The KLA: braced to defend and control
Over
the last year, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has transformed itself
from a band of guerrillas to a structured force capable of running political
and internal affairs. Zoran Kusovac reports how they did it.
When, in late February
1998, the Serbian police decided to put an end to a budding pro-independence
movement of armed Kosovo Albanian fighters in the Drenica region, they
were confident that their opponents would be easily dealt with. Their
sources indicated that behind the pompous name, Ushtria Çlirimtare
ë Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army - UÇK or KLA), hid
just a couple of hundred hard-line ethnic Albanians who would be wiped
out in one decisive attack. The planning for the operation, however, revealed
the very dilemmas which were to plague Serbian operations in Kosovo from
that moment onwards. The Serbs needed to decide whether to use adequately
sized specialised anti-guerrilla units and run the risk of granting the
KLA importance - something they wanted to avoid at all costs - or whether
to play down the KLA's importance by just using regular police and Federal
Army units.
The Serbs opted for a politically safer option, but the only tactics regular
troops knew was 'scorched earth' - hitting any suspected 'terrorist resistance'
with all means available. Such indiscriminate force met with fierce opposition
from the Jashari family compound in Prekaz, and it took more than 48 hours
to end all resistance there. The results showed that to silence less than
10 armed males the forces of the Serbian Interior Ministry (Ministarstvo
Unutrasnjih Poslova - MUP) killed more than 40 civilians, including women
and children.
A call to arms
While the Serbian side claimed that the 'terrorists have been anihilated
once for all', pictures from Drenica of destruction and grief served as
an unexpected impetus for KLA recruitment. Thousands of young Albanians
left their jobs, both in Kosovo and all across Western Europe where they
had been working, to go and join the force fighting for the independence
of their homeland: Kosovo. So rapid and unexpected was the inflow of recruits
that the KLA initially was unable to cope. Many made their way into Drenica,
which, despite the bitter defeats of February and March, was seen as the
centre of the resistance.
The creation of
the KLA
It is still not easy to understand how it was possible to bring together,
organise and arm the 30,000 fighters that the KLA mustered between the
spring and summer of 1998. A key factor in explaining the unexpectedly
rapid growth of the KLA, however, is the nature of Albanian society. Closely
knit, with strong family, clan and regional affiliances, Albanians have
always been regarded as inpenetrable to outsiders and loyal to their own
sense of unity. This helped them to rally behind the non-violent resistance
advocated by the grass-roots ethnic-Albanian Democratic League of Kosovo
(Lidhja Demokratike ë Kosovës - LDK) and its leader, Ibrahim
Rugova. However, with the appearance of the KLA and an upsurge of armed
actions against the MUP and 'loyal Albanians' (those who continued to
work for the state or directly co-operated with its executive bodies in
Kosovo), the determination to pursue the ultimate aim - independence for
Kosovo - by non-violent means was undermined. The KLA appeared in public
on 28 November 1997. The fact that the Jasharis were just ordinary farmers
and not professional soldiers reinforced the belief that an armed uprising
had a chance.
The would-be fighters approached the former political prisoners in their
respective regions with offers to fight. Most Albanian political prisoners
were former students arrested in the 1980s for their participation in
the movement demanding a Republic of Kosovo within Federal Yugoslavia.
The movement itself was quite idealistic, but a heavy-handed response
by the government, long prison sentences and the impossibility of finding
employment upon release had radicalised the youths to the point that they
were now ready to lead the armed struggle. Other leaders included the
younger generation of students (dismissed from the universities when Kosovo
autonomy was forcibly abolished in the early 1990s), teachers, doctors,
members of influential families and known local rogues. Army officers
and police inspectors who were purged in the early 1990s were the only
ones with any military knowledge. As soon as rumour spread that there
was a core of resistance in a particular area, potential recruits were
directed there by word of mouth.
The self-proclaimed
government of the 'Republic of Kosovo' collected a 3 per cent income tax
on all exiles working in Germany, Switzerland and Austria, but much more
important for the financing of the KLA were the funds sent by family members
who worked abroad. Before the beginning of mass resistance they simply
served to sustain the large families and clans, but once a decision was
taken to fight those funds were further augmented by additional donations
and re-directed towards the procurement of arms.
An important role in the collection of funds was played by a Swiss-based
fund, 'Homeland Calls' (Vendlindhja Therrët), which organised large-scale
collections, first across Europe and later in the USA, where the Albanian
community in the New York area alone numbers over 200,000.
Arms were procured from all sources, but the single most important early
channel was from the Serbs themselves. Worried that the break-up of former
Yugoslavia might prompt an early uprising of Kosovo Albanians, the Serbian
government distributed an estimated 75,000 rifles to Kosovo Serbs. Albanians,
traditionally people with a gun-culture, kept as many weapons as they
could and kept buying Kalashnikovs from their Serb neighbours. The Serbs
were quite happy to sell, relying on the might of the Yugoslav Army (Vojska
Jugoslavije - VJ) to protect them. An important channel was Albania, where
the disintegration of the central government in the spring of 1997 and
subsequent looting of military depots put more than half a million small
arms on the market. The price for a Kalashnikov in northern Albania was
as low as $100; in Kosovo it was double. Supplies started flowing across
the mountains, first in small groups, but then convoys quickly grew to
up to 200 mountain ponies and a thousand men.
The gun-culture of the Albanians, the need for concealment and the lack
of trained officers created a propensity for individual weapons. At first
the only weapons apart from the usual rifles were shoulder-launched anti-tank
weapons, usually of the early generations, and limited numbers of small-calibre
mortars. To the surprise of many, land-mines were barely used, not even
for perimeter defence, but this also reflects the Albanians' heroic system
of values, where the only worthy way to fight was deemed as being with
a gun.
Over-confidence,
near disaster
As the KLA grew, the Serbian security forces stood mesmerised and uncertain
what to do. The MUP simply stopped patrolling large swaths of the country
and the VJ, until then not directly involved in the fighting, chose to
co-exist with the KLA - the two entities practically ignoring each other's
presence. Growing overconfident, the KLA proclaimed 'free territories'
and blocked the main roads. The government kept control of larger towns,
but it was denied safe communications and the western town of Pec had
to be supplied in a roundabout way through Montenegro.
At this stage the KLA still had little central co-ordination and no unified
command structure. Each operational area cared only about itself, attracting
funds and weapons through its own channels and recruiting local villagers.
There was no training, and logistics consisted mostly of providing enough
ammunition to all troops. Food was provided mainly by requisitioning supplies
available locally and comanders hardly cared to take any advice from the
few with military knowledge. The amateurishness of the organisation was
reflected in the fact that in July 1998 there were only three field hospitals.
The total number of fighters had reached 30,000 by mid-June, but a large
number of those were just locals carrying guns in their own villages.
The government finally acted in the early summer, when the KLA attempted
to take a major town, Orahovac, which was practically surrounded by guerrilla-controlled
areas. The KLA failed to properly plan and execute the attack, however,
displaying a tactical incompetence and a lack of proper command and fighting
discipline.
By mid-summer the MUP was applying all the lessons it had learned, firstly
removing all roadblocks by force and freeing up communications. It was
aided by heavy-arms support from the VJ, but its main allies were incompetent
- often competing - KLA commanders, who did not use their mobility to
their benefit but defended roadblocks, canyons and mountain passes with
no attempt at surprise or flanking actions.
In July the VJ officially extended the border belt to 5km, allowing it
to strike at a whole string of villages between Djakovica and Prizren,
which were the main collection points for arms from Albania and centres
of resistance. The KLA was thus broken into isolated pockets of resistance.
What, in turn, saved the KLA from ultimate military defeat was the incompetence
of the Serbian security forces: in destroying not just the fighters, but
whole villages as potential KLA bases, they sent the entire population
fleeing in the woods and hills. When the number of displaced civilians
passed 100,000, the international community had to react, and in the face
of the threat of NATO airstrikes Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic reached
a deal with US envoy Richard Holbrooke that ended the offensive, allowing
refugees to return.
The real army
The deal also introduced unarmed Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE) 'compliance verifiers', whose task was to monitor the
truce. That truce, uneasy as it was, survived the winter - not because
of the dubious role of the verifiers, but because the Serbs and Albanians
needed a military and political respite.
The KLA used the
winter the best way it could, finally establishing a competent central
command structure centred around the General Staff (Shtabi i Përgjithshëm
- ShP) and dividing Kosovo into operational zones. Initially there were
six of these, but OZ No 7 (Karadak) was added in February along the southern
flank and the crucial communication lines with Macedonia through Kacanik
gorge.
The principle of subordination was reinforced and applied almost fully. Several local commanders who were reluctant to accept central command quietly slipped away. Among those was a former commander of the southwest, Hajdin Abazi (nom de guerre Lum Haxhiu), known for his encounter with Richard Holbrooke in Junik, who returned to civilian life in Germany.
The current KLA
All of the KLA's military and political matters are now run by the ShP,
which consists of 16 known members although there may be up to 20 of them.
Each member has a specific responsibility, but their relations are not
always harmonious. The ShP established at least eight directorates (drejtoria)
and several services (sherbimi), some of which are subordinated to the
Directorates while others are under direct ShP command.
Contrary to what would be expected, most influence and power lies within
the Political Directorate (Drejtoria Politike), led by the rising political
star and head of the Kosovo negotiating delegation to France Hashim Thaçi.
Many consider his most serious long-term opponent to be Hxavit Haliti,
whose several years of political imprisonment are marred by allegations
of collaboration with Serbian authorities. Haliti has very close links
with the current government in Tirana and is trying to put all the financing
of the KLA under his control. Although Sylejman Selimi, 'Sultan', has
been named commander-in-chief, the extent of his real influence is not
clear. It appears that his surprise nomination during the first round
of negotiations in Rambouilet was an attempt by hard-line Kosovo politician
Adem Demaçi to explore rifts among ShP members and prevent the
acceptance of the Kosovo Interim Agreement. Losing the battle against
the Kosovo accord, Demaçi had to exit the political scene, but
the ShP decided not to cause internal divisions by replacing Selimi by
a more influential and militarily competent member.
It is quite a peculiar feature of the ShP that its Operations Directorate
is still feeble, and it is not even known who heads it. This reflects
the relative weakness of the ShP in imposing efficient military control
over influential OZ commanders. While accepting ShP guidance, the OZ commanders
still remain largely independent in the conduct of operations and even
maintain their own parallel and independent financing and logistics. It
appears that one of the main short-term goals of the ShP is to impose
tighter control on OZ commanders. So far most resistance to centralisation
seems to come from the commanders of OZs No 5, 'Drini', and No 2, 'Remi'.
One of the main criticisms
of the ShP on the ground was its over-representation of the Drenica region
and the lack of trained military personnel. The first was addressed by
including more members from other regions, while the second cannot be
solved in the short term. A system of military education was established,
however, where the central Military Academy (Akademia ë Ardhshme
Ushtarake) trains higher officers (from just below OZ commanders to battalion
commander level), while at least three of the OZs have their own Military
Training Schools, which train officers down to squad leader level. Courses,
which take an average four to six weeks, are conducted mostly by former
Yugoslav Army officers and are said to include elements of tactics, operations,
logistics and war and humanitarian law. While the effectiveness of such
short, makeshift courses is limited and mainly a morale-building operation,
they may serve to bolster the tactical and operational knowledge that
have been the KLA's main deficiency. At least 600 officers have completed
various courses so far; the Military Academy is currently into its 4th
class.
The KLA has not yet learned to fully exploit its mobility and is completely
untrained and unskilled in the tactical use of weapons. Units concentrate
and use frontal patterns of attack and defence rather than dispersing
to cover larger areas and support each other with intersecting arcs of
fire. Many weapons are not used to their best advantage: anti-armour weapons
are often not given small-arms cover and mortars have little mobility.
Villages are defended from inside the houses rather than from perimeter
positions, making it easier for Serbian forces to neutralise them with
cannon fire. Nevertheless, there are signs that the necessary tactical
knowledge is filtering through.
The number of forces available to OZ commanders varies considerably. Two
OZs have four confirmed brigades each while another three OZs have three
brigades each (typical brigade strength being just over 1,000). The smallest
OZ, Karadak, so far consists of just one brigade. Brigades are named after
fallen fighters ('martyrs') and reflect a strong sense of regional loyalty,
but transfers of forces between brigades to bolster other OZs are still
relatively common, although units do not disband when their fighters are
detached. The main operational unit appears to be the company, typically
50-60 strong, which includes supporting mortars, heavy machine-guns and
an anti-tank detachment.
As far as it can be estimated from past performance, the KLA does not
yet possess any heavy artillery nor a significant anti-aircraft capability.
Insider sources claim this is a conscious decision as heavy weapons would
mar mobility, but at least 50 shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles
(mostly SA-7/14s but including several Stingers) have been confirmed in
use. Small arms reflect the multitude of sources of procurement; the Kalashnikov
family still predominates, but exotic weapons such as Barrett .50in sniping
rifles, Steyr AUG and Heckler & Koch G3 assault rifles have been sighted.
There is a limited amount of night-vision equipment.
Operational mobility is best reflected in the nature of various headquarters
and field commands, which are often moved according to necessity. Communications
are still rudimentary, with satellite telephones forming the backbone
of OZ HQs and field radios still being in short supply. In areas covered
by cellular telephone networks, mobile phones are used.
One of the weakest points of the KLA is the coverage and extent of the
medical services. As far as it is known, there are less than half a dozen
field hospitals, but even those are ill-equipped and understaffed. Medical
evacuation and first-aid posts are virtually non-existent, and to encounter
a fighter with a field dressing - let alone one who would know how to
use it - would be extremely rare. However, it seems that the determination
of the fighters is so high that this does not preclude them from earnestly
engaging in combat.
On the political side, the KLA is highly aware of its responsibilities
in the running of civilian affairs in the areas it controls. Civil affairs
were first the responsibility of the Political Directorate, but when it
was realised that those tasks were numerous and specific a Public Order
and Civil Administration Directorate (Drejtoria për Marrëdhënie
Publike dhe Administrim Civil) was formed in late 1998. The fact that
it was entrusted to one of the most veteran ShP members and the first
KLA spokesman, Jakup Krasniqi, indicates the degree of importance attached
to civilian affairs. This might prove important if the KLA were to be
transformed into an internationally controlled internal-security organisation
as foreseen by the Interim Agreement, which the Kosovo Albanians unilaterally
accepted in Paris on 18 March. Similar civil administration bodies have
been formed in all local communities under KLA control; these would form
the backbone of the future civilian government.
The successful transformation of the KLA during the winter indicates it
has overcome internal difficulties following last summer's string of defeats
and has consolidated. It is now also the one and only force on the Kosovo
Albanian side; an attempt by the 'prime minister' of the self-proclaimed
Kosovo government, Bujar Bukoshi, to raise a parallel fighting force under
his command - the Armed Force of the Republic of Kosovo (Forcave Armatosure
ë Republikes ë Kosoves - FARK) - ended in failure following
the disbandment of the only FARK brigade and the flight to Albania of
its commander, Colonel Tahir Zema.
Having raised the awareness of the Albanians in Kosovo and largely unified
the hitherto undecided population, the KLA also realised the importance
of political means. With some 24,000 fighters and a recruitment potential
for at least as many again within a matter of weeks, it is now a much
stronger fighting force than in 1998, although definitely not capable
of successfully tackling the MUP and VJ. It is neither yet a proper army
nor has it managed to expel the much stronger Serbian police and military
forces, but its status has been raised by its acceptance by the international
community as the rightful participant in the negotiating process.
Despite all Serbian efforts to treat it as a terrorist group, the KLA
is now the strongest player on the Kosovo Albanian political scene and
fully aware of its current status and responsibilities. All signs indicate
that, should the Serbian authorities accept the Kosovo Interim Agreement,
the political arm of the KLA would transform into the Kosovo Liberation
Party (Partia Çlirimtare ë Kosovës - PÇK). The
requisite political wisdom and resources to take on a civilian role without
surrenduring its position to the previous civilian structures of the Kosovo
Albanians are already in evidence.
Zoran
Kusovac
Zoran Kusovac
is a South-Eastern Europe analyst and consultant who has covered the Balkan
affairs for over 10 years.