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KOSOVO: CAN KFOR WIN THE PEACE?
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Winning
the peace in Kosovo could prove more difficult than winning the war. Richard
Connaughton examines the issues of peacekeeping, from the immediate uncertainty
of unity of command to the long-term risks posed by partitioning
The Kumanovo Military Technical Agreement (MTA) signed on 9 June officially ended the 11-week war in Kosovo, although NATO air strikes did not officially cease until there was clear evidence of the withdrawal of Serbian forces from the province. This agreement has brought with it a new set of challenges as a heavily armed international peacekeeping force enters Kosovo in a bid to restore peace to the Balkans.
The first peacekeepers of a NATO-led international force expected to number about 50,000 began moving into Kosovo within days of the agreement being signed. By 6 July there were 29,000 military personnel in place in Kosovo and 9,000 in Macedonia operating under a NATO unified command structure. The full 50,000 troops are expected in theatre by the end of September.
One of the main challenges for Kosovo Force (KFOR) military staff has been establishing and maintaining unity of command. Russian troops moved into Kosovo before NATO troops on 11-12 June and their refusal to subordinate themselves to the NATO command structure has complicated this issue.
The Helsinki Agreement signed last month between NATO and Russia outlined Russian participation in KFOR. According to the agreement, Russian troops would deploy into French, German and US sectors rather than having a sector of their own. The agreement limited Russian troop contribution in Kosovo to 3,616.
Complications subsequently arose when Russia sought to expand its influence out of the three sectors and into the Italian sector. In response, NATO requested Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania to deny Russian military flights access to their air space to fly reinforcements to Kosovo. Following negotiations last week, the dispute was resolved and Russian reinforcements have resumed their flights into Pristina.
"The talks have concluded in a satisfactory fashion. All of the issues have been clarified just as was required by the Helsinki Agreement," NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen Wesley Clark said last week. "We see no military obstacle to the deployment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent."
Russian troops in Kosovo will be under NATO tactical control (TACON) which allows the headquarters of the three NATO brigades to issue orders to the Russian troops in their areas of responsibility. Although Russia has agreed to the KFOR rules of engagement (ROE), it will be allowed to add reservations.
Russian will deploy 3,600 plus 16 liaison officers in Kosovo. Of these, some 750 troops will be deployed in the vicinity of Pristina airport, a Russian officer will be designated commander of the airfield but NATO will control air operations. The Russians will provide airfield maintenance and other support. The entire Russian contingent should be in place by the end of July.
"There is a NATO chain of command and the Russians will have military representatives with that chain of command. They will follow the basis of the Helsinki accord and the NATO operations plan", Gen Clark said.
There will be some tasks the Russian contingents will not be expected to perform. These are believed to include the apprehension of those alleged to have committed atrocities. Russia has already defined this as a political rather than a military task.
Some 13 Partnership for Peace countries, including Ukraine, as well as Argentina, Ireland, Morocco, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates have expressed interest in assisting KFOR. This will presumably cause its own command and control problems.
Coalition operations have long been prone to command and control problems. During UNOSOM II, the UN operation in Somalia in 1993, a US Army Ranger task force suffered casualties while mounting an operation to seize faction leaders in Mogadishu. Instead of responding immediately to US calls for assistance, the Pakistani and Malaysian contingents sought clearance from their respective capitals before committing troops. However, according to one US officer: "We complained when other units in the UN force referred orders back to their own headquarters, but when it comes to unity of command, we are the worst."
Kosovo has demonstrated the difficulties NATO has in shifting its emphasis from the territorial defence missions, which dominated Cold War planning, to that of expeditionary conflict. Many countries have yet to reorganise their armies to be able to rapidly deploy to conflict areas. The past weeks have revealed not only the necessity of developing new political 'doctrine' to balance the rights of sovereign states in intrastate disputes but also for a common military doctrine.
Intervention on the scale of KFOR requires states to make available adequate resources despite other military commitments. It is a highly selective pick-and-choose process that will demand clearer understanding of the when, why and how of military intervention.
UK Defence Secretary George Robertson last week announced the UK is withdrawing some 700 troops from Kosovo in order to streamline the command of its forces. The forces to be withdrawn include the headquarters of an armoured brigade, seven helicopters and support staff, two field ambulances and a high velocity missile battery. According to Robertson, the troops to be withdrawn were no longer necessary with UK forces "fully settled" in their area of operation.
Finding enough troops trained for peacekeeping is also a problem for Western politicians. Final force levels of peacekeeping deployments usually exceed the initial force figures. At full strength, some 50,000 personnel are expected to participate in KFOR but only 38,000 have arrived to date. It is unlikely that troops will be taken from SFOR and deployed to Kosovo. Throughout the air campaign, SFOR troops distanced themselves from the bombing for security reasons and it is unlikely the two forces will, at this stage, share either personnel or command structure.
Politicians in NATO countries and Russia must focus on sending to Kosovo the best-suited troops in accordance with the principle of 'forces for courses'. In Kigali in 1994, Belgian Col Luc Marchal, commanding troops of the UN Mission in Rwanda, complained that half the UN-allocated troops were ineffective. According to one KFOR officer in Pristina, NATO "recognises this as a potential problem".
Regardless of military skills, countries must also demonstrate political will. The fact that NATO pilots during Operation 'Allied Force' were instructed to fly at 15,000ft during bombing raids over Serbia clearly demonstrates that NATO governments were unwilling to take any casualties. The death of 18 soldiers during the 'Battle of Mogadishu' still casts a shadow over the USA's willingness to commit US troops to peace support operations.
One of the lessons from the Bosnian peace settlement was that partitioning Bosnia into three entities has resulted in the polarisation of ethnic groups. Separating Serbs, Muslims and Croatians into sectors left ethnic outposts vulnerable. Each ethnic group ethnically cleansed their respective sectors, mostly by pushing the others out of the area, creating long-term territorial divisions.
In contrast NATO is encouraging Serbs living in Kosovo to remain in the province under the protection of KFOR. Avoiding partition reduces the long-term risk of internal conflict. It was in Serb President Slobodan Milosevic's interest for Russia to occupy its own sector in Kosovo's 'sacred' north and effect a de facto partition. Learning from the Bosnian experience, NATO avoided calls made at Rambouillet in Februaryfor Kosovo independence thereby preventing polarisation of nationalist sentiment between the two factions.
How long NATO will remain in Kosovo will depend on a number of factors. Many believe that central to Serbia's rehabilitation and subsequent peace in the region is the departure of Milosevic from the political scene. It will take some time for all 780,000 displaced Kosovar Albanians to return to their homes. Over half have returned home to date, while the rest are returning slowly. The mine clearance process will also take years to complete. There is also the matter of tracking down and extraditing from Serbia those alleged to have committed atrocities.
As witnessed in Bosnia and Croatia, it is much easier to send forces than to extract them. These examples demonstrate the importance of establishing clear objectives as well as setting a deadline for withdrawing KFOR forces.
It may be that not all participating KFOR nations will be willing to stay for a prolonged period as all contributing states have different thresholds of tolerance of casualties, cost and the influence of overstretch and overcommitment. At times during Operation 'Allied Force' it appeared a struggle to keep the coalition unified. In the post-war period, it may become an even greater challenge.
Richard
Connaughton is a military consultant and historian based
in the UK
Additional reporting by JDW staff
Jane's
Defence Weekly