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BALKAN ENDGAME? JDW 31 March 1999
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BALKAN ENDGAME?
Following devastating
airstrikes in Yugoslavia, what are the options for an acceptable settlement
on the ground? Richard Bassett examines the prospects for the future and
the lessons of the past
In the wake of NATO's
attack on Yugoslavia the Balkans ends the century much as it began; an
expression of great power rivalry and a source of potentially destabilising
conflict.
As at least one military
historian of note, John Keegan, has written, the problems of Bosnia, Macedonia
and indeed Kosovo would be wearily familiar to any official of the Austro-Hungarian
empire posted to Sarajevo in 1908. The inevitable competing spheres of
influence led the great 19th-century German Chancellor, Bismarck, to observe:
"The Balkans are not worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier."
If history is one
of the inescapable millstones of the Balkans, geography is another. Albania
today still lies across two of the most important routes that link Europe
with the East.
Its appearance on
the global stage, in 1912 at the Ambassador's conference, when it was
described as the "child of Austria, with Italy acting as midwife"
was an attempt to balance the pretensions of Russia's main protegé
in the region, Serbia, and limit its access to the Mediterranean.
Today, there is still
anxiety on the part of the western powers, notably the USA, over Serbian
and, by extension, Russian influence over the eastern Mediterranean. At
the same time, those in Europe (judging by recent comments from the French
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, they include France) who, like Russia, are
fretful of the "naked expansion of US power" in the aftermath
of the Cold War, are equally keen to ensure that the Balkans does not
become a US sphere of influence.
Former West German
Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, underlined his belief that this was just a
new twist to the old game when he said in a recent interview: "Only
the Americans would be naive enough to imagine that there could be a lasting
peace in the Balkans".
If, after the airstrikes,
Milosevic backs down and a multi-national force is deployed then that
force may not be an entirely NATO entity.
Seen in the context
of any future envisaged troop deployment in Kosovo, it is clear that Serbia
could only sign up to a deployment which reflected an agreement between
the powers (in this case the USA, on the one hand, and Russia and Moscow's
supporters on the other).
Such an agreement
has proved extremely difficult to reach, not least because of exaggerated
demands on both sides which have had to be reined in by some very tough
negotiation between US Secretary of State, Madelaine Albright and Russian
prime minister and former KGB spymaster, Yevgeny Primakov.
But all the powers
know that only when faced with a credible united front can Milosevic be
persuaded to back down. Eventually the advantages of having the West disarm
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) may become apparent to the Serbs and
the stationing of Russian troops will ensure the protection of their fellow
Slav citizens in Kosovo.
One of the most sensitive
issues is the exact positioning of the Russian contingent as this will
inevitably be the de facto line of partition in the province. In the eyes
of the KLA, the British and the French, traditional allies of the Serbs
in two world wars, can also be relied on to defend the Serbs, though London
and Paris would, with reason, deny this.
As the French and UK forces would come under a NATO commander, the KLA believes that US influence which is largely pro-Albanian would manage to prevent a too tough approach being taken towards the Albanians.
However, recent suggestions
to shift the political control structure of the deployment from NATO to
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) would
of course neutralise US influence and be an ominous development for the
Albanians.
It is, however, quite
feasible to see a de facto splintering of Kosovo into separate zones not
dissimilar to those which divided Berlin, Vienna and Trieste and its hinterland
after 1945, though presumably with more cordial relations between the
various participating forces than during the Cold War.
However, given the different interests of the participants and the fact
that a NATO and Russian force would be sitting cheek by jowl under separate
commands, it can be assumed that a great deal of time and energy will
be devoted to working out the correct protocols to govern this interface
of highly sensitive, and in practice divergent, commands.
However, even if in Kosovo there is an eventual resolution of the spheres-of-influence problem, the Albanian question, as is frequently mentioned, also spills into Macedonia and(less frequently mentioned) Montenegro.
Macedonia has an
ethnic population of Albanians which comprises 23% of the country's entire
population. Fears that it would try to break away from the republic have
been behind the generally cordial ties between Skopje and Belgrade.
Despite denials by
the ethnic Albanian leaders, there is no doubt that, situated as they
are close to the Albanian frontier, the temptations of a future tie-up
with a Greater Albania remain high on the agenda.
Even without the Albanian issue, Macedonia has long been a controversial hot spot where Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian interests collide. Greece has long contested the right of the Macedonians to use the name of Macedonia, saying that it implied a territorial claim over Greek territory. Moreover, Greek politicians until relatively recently attempted to undermine the new state at international forums and in discussions involving new trade links.
However, more recently
under Russian, US and European pressure the Athens government has adopted
a more supportive line, though this is of little comfort to the ethnic
Albanian minority.
Bulgaria which has long maintained that Macedonian is only a Bulgarian dialect, has also become more supportive of the government in Skopje, though this is partly a result of the government, dominated by the newly elected VMRO party, enjoying traditional ties with Bulgaria.
Before the Second
World War, Bulgaria financed with Italy the VMRO party which was then
dedicated to destroying the newly created Yugoslav state and was implicated
in the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in
1934.
The news earlier
this month that Bulgaria is to donate 150 main battle tanks, including
115 T-55As, and nearly 150 artillery pieces caused some concern in western
embassies. The concern was particularly acute over the arms import as
the Bulgarian donation came on the heels of the supply by Germany of BTR-70
armoured personnel carriers. With all Macedonian army leave cancelled
and the deployment of two brigades on the Albanian/Kosovo frontier, analysts
fear that the arsenal now being created in this small country is a tinderbox
awaiting ignition.
More ominously, the
build-up of weapons, with the tacit agreement of Belgrade suggests that
the future of Macedonia may have already been decided by its neighbours.
The emergence of
Bulgaria as a regional player is also viewed with some disquiet in the
region - traditionally Bulgaria and Serbia have a long history of emnity,
though some analysts point to the old Comintern idea of a Serbian-Bulgarian
federation possibly being revived. Such a development, however, has been
described as two stranded swimmers linking hands across a sea of Macedonian
troubles.
Certainly the agreement on 22 February by the Bulgarian and Macedonian governments to "put an end to the artificial problems between our two countries" suggests that events are moving rapidly towards some form of anti-Albanian front and that a military "solution" may be imminent.
The language of the
February agreement is adamant in its reconciliation of the Bulgarian-Macedonian
differences claiming that neither government will allow its territory
to be used by groups hostile to the other. In diplomatic jargon this is
a clear warning to Albanian groups smuggling weapons into or, indeed,
out of Macedonia.
It remains to be
seen whether this agreement stabilises Macedonia. The clear anti-Albanian
implications of the agreement may drive the ethnic minority in Macedonia
to desperate measures. Moreover, in the long-term, Bulgarian -Serbian-Greek
rivalry over Macedonia is inevitable and partition may be unavoidable
also here.
Montenegro also has a sizeable Albanian community though only forming 8% of the population. Moreover, in contrast to the Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo, these Albanians are predominantly Catholic rather than Muslim.
However, Montenegro is at perhaps one of the most strategic points in the Adriatic. Already at the beginning of this century, the Imperial Austrian Navy saw the importance of the great bay of Kotor, which until the Second World War was one of the most naturally defensible harbours in the Adriatic.
Even today, the harbour
is the major naval installation of the Yugoslav navy and is Serbia's vital
access to the Adriatic. The harbour is guarded by the Prevlaka peninsular
(see map) which has been the bone
of contention between Serbia and Croatia since hostilities ended between
those two countries four years ago. Croatia is adamant that it cannot
cede control of the peninsular without endangering its own security interests
although for the same reason, Serbia is determined to ensure that the
peninsular is controlled by Belgrade. Otherwise the entire Serbian fleet
and its facilities can be deployed only subject to Croatian veto. Unsurprisingly,
these facilities were a priority target for NATO attack.
Partly for this reason,
Serbia last year initiated a plan to move against Montenegro's democratically
elected anti-Belgrade government. The plan met with considerable resistance
among the upper ranks of the Yugoslav army, many of whose officers are
Montenegrin and provoked the resignation of the Serbian Chief of the General
staff, General Perisic.
A move against Montenegro
is still likely, however, for the strategic reasons outlined above especially
if western funds, particularly from Germany, continue to pour into Montenegro
in an attempt to detach the leadership there from Milosevic's control.
As well as German attention, Montenegro remains a traditional focus for
Russian activity. Before 1914, the Russians established the biggest of
the legations in the Montenegrin capital.
During the Cold War,
a small but significant remnant of this legacy remained in the shape of
the small Soviet merchantman spy-vessel which remained at anchor in the
bay of Kotor, despite Tito's break with the Comintern in 1948. It was
a token presence but one which underlined the Churchill-Stalin deal that
Yugoslavia should be divided 50-50.
For the West that
meant a Yugoslavia that was not part of the Warsaw Pact. For the Soviets
that meant despite the formal break no offensive activity or alliance
with NATO. For both sides there were small intelligence favours of which
the Kotor merchantman was one.
Russia's views on
events in Montenegro are likely to be consonant with those of Serbia and
therefore hostile to any moves that appear to detach the country from
the Serbian orbit.
Thus as the century
ends, the problems of the region remain bound up with the ambitions and
aspirations of the global powers as well as the hopes of different ethnic
groups. It is therefore perhaps illuminating to examine in some detail
the solutions those powers sought to impose on the region in those times.
Before the First World War, diplomacy was secret though in practice there were no secrets between ambassadors and those involved in foreign affairs. An exception, perhaps, occurred during the First World War with the controversial Treaty of London which lured Italy into breaking its alliance with Austria and Germany in order to gain territory at Vienna's expense.
Fortunately for students
of diplomacy in the Balkans, the treaty was published when the Bolsheviks
came to power in Russia in 1917.
In addition to the
clauses relevant to Italy's northern territorial acquisitions, there were
several which underlined the status of the Adriatic Ð the region which
is now so hotly contested.
Italy was given important
rights over the direction of Albania's foreign policy. Albania itself
remained partitioned between Serbia, Greece and Italy which had rights
over the port of Vlore (Valona), the key to the Straits of Otranto.
The rump Albania was designated a Muslim state to be governed from Tirana,
a concession few European states would tolerate today in a period of increasing
religious polarisation and anti-islamic feeling. Above all, however, the
signatories to the treaty, which included Russia and France, all agreed
to work together to prevent the Balkans becoming an area of dispute
between them. In the attempted agreements hammered out between NATO and
Russia the spirit of this Treaty can still be seen, however different
the territorial lines drawn on the map today. Although the USA is a new
player in this game, there are reasons to think that it does wish to work
through consensus though it may not understand as vividly as the Europeans
the potential dangers of an uncontrolled conflict originating in the Balkans.
NATO's surprise guarantee of Albania's territorial integrity last week
is incompatible with the Treaty of London's intentions.
In any event the USA's room for manoeuvre has been dramatically cut down by the coalition of European and Russian forces which are traditionally pro-Serbian. It remains to be seen what the USA can do for the Albanians despite all the talk of this being a "single-polar world".
For its part, the
UK, for which the Balkans has always been a traditional area of expertise,
remains committed to establishing a lasting solution for the region. Although
it no longer stands at England's imperial jugular, the region remains
critical to the Mediterranean and the long-term interests of Europe. As
far as London is concerned, it is synonymous with the 500-year-old game
of erecting a balance of power.
The interests of
the third partner, Russia, however, remain perhaps the most constant -preservation
of some presence, albeit a token one, along the Adriatic and the prevention
of the peninsular being dominated by any one power. Here the activities
of the USA are a cause for serious alarm in Russian strategic counsels.
The precarious internal
situation in Russia also militates against the confidence-building measures
the West feels are essential to any joint solution of the Balkans crisis.
The obvious policy disputes between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and
Primakov may be just questions of degree but they continue to overshadow
the ability to come to agreements at the highest level which can be seen
as having a chance of sticking.
Yet without such
an agreement there is every indication that the Balkans will continue
to smoulder and that the flames of ethnic cleansing will continue to blaze
for several years to come.
Richard Bassett, JDW's Business Editor, is a former Central Europe correspondent for the Times of London
Jane's Defence Weekly