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Iran's conventional forces remain key to deterring potential threats

20 January 2006
Iran's conventional forces remain key to deterring potential threats

By Michael Knights

The key target in any operation, regardless of its scope, would be Iran's nuclear industry. Attacks on Iran's air defences would not seek to cause long-term degradation, although any large-scale operation would require a broader range of air defence targets to be struck.

The minimum force packages required for an Israeli or US strike would vary widely. An Israeli strike on even a single Iranian nuclear facility would stretch Israel's nascent long-range strike capability and require innovative basing and airborne refuelling solutions. These operations could be undertaken by F-15I fighter jets with limited post-launch refuelling support or even by F-16I jets using new buddy-refuelling capabilities.

Air-launched standoff options such as Popeye missiles or submarine-launched Harpoon or Popeye Turbo missiles might not be able to penetrate hardened nuclear targets, instead being limited to littoral targets. These restrictions strongly suggest that the Bushehr nuclear reactor site is the only facility that offers the right blend of feasibility and payoff for an Israeli strike.

The US could choose to engage a larger but still focused set of nuclear targets - for example, Bushehr and key gasification and enrichment facilities - or it could widen the operation to include a range of military and regime targets. Washington would be unlikely to receive support from regional allies and possibly even the UK, which would need to authorise use of the regional airbase at Diego Garcia.

As a result, the principal assets used would be long-range land attack cruise missiles, with a small but pivotal direct attack role for the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber. Using ship and submarine-launched Tomahawks or B-52-launched conventional air-launched cruise missiles (CALCM) against the most distant targets would require the US to shoot from a Tomahawk 'basket' or a CALCM 'box' within the Gulf or just east of the Straits of Hormuz, creating major force protection issues in the event of Iranian retaliation.

Maintaining air defences

Iran is unlikely to seek to develop a fully integrated nationwide air defence system like the Iraqi model of the 1980s. Instead, Iran uses a point defence strategy, with its strongest defences located around strategic points such as Tehran, Esfahan, Kharq Island, Bandar Abbas and Bushehr. Highly integrated local networks of interceptor aircraft and ground-based SAMs will provide layered protection for these areas.

They will employ a mobile defence involving the regular relocation of SAMs and a network of low-flying fighters screened by mountain ranges and teamed with F-14A controllers operating at higher altitudes and further inland. The system would aim to ambush penetrating attackers and their supporting AWACS or tankers with salvos of long-range SAM, beyond visual range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAM) fired by F-14As and shorter-ranged air-to-air missiles (AAM) delivered by other fighters.

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