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JSF - Hidden problems of stealth
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| 21 April 2006 |
Bill Sweetman IDR Technology and Aerospace Editor
Minnesota
While there is no Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) export 'variant' as such, it is apparent from a review of open sources that it would be practical to deliver JSFs in different configurations with different signatures to match national operational requirements documents, protecting US and UK aircraft from any compromise of their own low-observable (LO) systems.
Stealth is not like the mythical ring of invisibility in JRR Tolkien's Lord of the Rings: it is not a single feature that confers invisibility. It is a blend of things on the aircraft that are obviously technologies that are generic and quite widely used and understood; components which are unique and exotic; and some features that are not visible on the aircraft at all but are nevertheless crucial to making the LO system work.
Building less-stealthy JSFs for export has been considered. One source close to the JSF programme has said that the US Department of Defense's theatre commanders-in-chief have advocated a single JSF configuration, because multiple levels of LO would complicate joint operations.
The LO community itself - covering JSF, F-22 and other programmes - opposed this view, fearing technology compromise.
"The commanders in the field want coalition allies to have highly capable aircraft. It's the lower level people who don't want to share the technology," the source said.
Further complicating this issue is that the rules on the export of stealth technologies, as well as of dual-use technologies that are important to stealth, are not made by the JSF programme office but by senior Pentagon leaders who define disclosure policy with the help of the Low Observables Executive Committee (LO-EXCOM). The EXCOM includes representatives from the services, intelligence agencies and all major stealth programmes, including 'black' or unacknowledged programmes.
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