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Learning lessons from the Kursk
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| 30 November 2000 |
Vice Adm Einar Skorgen
When a nuclear weapons-capable submarine sinks uncontrolled in international waters, this is the kind of accident that creates international interest - politically as well as militarily.
More than a week after the 12 August sinking of the Russian submarine Kursk in the Barents Sea, the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy had lost one of its most sophisticated nuclear submarines and the entire crew complement of 118.
The aim of the support operation was to rescue survivors from the sunken submarine. The task was to command the Norwegian support operation and to support and co-ordinate with the UK Royal Navy - to sustain the Russian rescue effort on the submarine Kursk.
Thankfully the nuclear reactors had switched off automatically and so far there has been no radiation registered from the wreck. Today, more than three months after the accident, many questions still need to be answered before anybody can claim to know why and how such a catastrophe happened - let's hope the true facts are made official.
From Commander North Norway's (COMNON's) HQ in Bodø it was registered that the Northern Fleet's traditional summer exercise started on 10 August and included a relatively high number of surface combatants, submarines and aircraft. The training activity was high and on 11 August included weapon firings in anti-air anti-surface and in anti-submarine warfare.
Norwegian Lockheed Martin P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft conducted surveillance in the Barents Sea daily and a Norwegian research ship in the area reported on the activities. Early on 13 August manoeuvres that indicated a change in the exercise towards a search-and-rescue mission were observed. However there were no indications of any live rescue operation.
Then on the morning of 14 August, information in the Russian media indicated the Kursk was in distress at the bottom of the sea in the exercise area. The scale of the accident was not reported. However, communication with the submarine was said to be working.
At 1200h on 14 August the Norwegian Ministry of Defence requested COMNON telephone the Commander Northern Fleet directly for details on the severity of the situation and to offer any assistance. The Northern Fleet staff said the situation was under control and that no help was needed.
Throughout 15 August a lot of inconsistent information on the situation was coming from Moscow. Discussions on NATO support were taking place in Brussels and the UK prepared their LR5 rescue submarine.
In Norway plans for submarine rescue operations were checked, but as long as there was no request, there was very little we could do.
Changes came on 16 August. The UK decided to deploy LR5 via Trondheim, Norway, and support was given as requested. At 1200h, the Chief of Staff Northern Fleet called COMNON on the direct line and requested assistance on behalf of the chief, Adm Popov. A special request for deep-sea divers (100m+) was sent to assist with the mating of the Russian rescue vehicle. Clearance came within hours to meet the Russian request.
At the same time, a deep-diving capacity was deployed after interrupting a mission at Haltenbanken, west of Southwest Norway. Eight hours after the request was received, the team was on its way to the rescue area.
Around this stage of the operation, rumours about the situation of the submarine's position were confusing. The content of such rumours could easily have slowed the progress of the support operation. Information such as a "60º list and 20º bow down" of the submarine, including a 2.5kt current on the casing made it very difficult to mate any rescue equipment. I told Adm Popov that if the rumours were true the possibility of connecting the rescue submarine was close to zero and that our assistance would be of no value.
17 August, five days since the accident. The Norman Pioneer with the LR5 embarked was en route and the Seaway Eagle with deep-sea divers embarked. Estimated time of arrival for both ships was 17 August. The need for technical information and consultation was vital. Russia's leadership indicated there was time enough for this after arrival in the area. COMNON insisted on technical information and meetings with Russian specialists, LR5 operators and divers not later than 19 August. Approval finally came late on 18 August. The Russian team was airlifted to Vardø (Norway), picked up by a Norwegian (GKN-Westland) Sea King rescue helicopter and taken to Seaway Eagle where the first trilateral meeting took place on the morning of 19 August.
A plan for the diving operation was worked out but the time to start the operation was unsettled. Both ships arrived at the outer rescue area late on 19 August and were ordered to stop and wait. This was so that the Russian team could conduct two more attempts to connect their own equipment before sending in deep-sea divers. This was due to take place on 20 August at the earliest.
I argued against any delay and pointed out that our intention still was to help to save lives, not to be passive observers. The arguing led to a Russian agreement to move Seaway Eagle to the diving position at once but leaving Norman Pioneer and LR5 20n miles off the position.
The first dive took place on the morning of 20 August, recording that the mating ring and the hatch were undamaged, the submarine in a horizontal position and, no sea currents. In other words, good working conditions.
The attempt to open the rescue hatch failed, giving hope that the trunk beneath was empty. This could mean the section below the trunk was not flooded. However information on how to operate the vent on the hatch was incorrect.
The need for correct technical information was again vital. It was pointed out to Adm Popov, who had embarked Seaway Eagle when he recognised the difficulties, that the Norwegian support operation was about to be cancelled without sufficient information on the rescue trunk and hatches.
Adm Popov made a decision that convinced me his priorities matched mine. He brought two diving specialists and an interpreter ashore, embarked another Oscar II-class and gave a demonstration aboard the submarine of the rescue system. This made it possible to continue the operation. Both hatches were opened early the next day only to reveal that Section 9 was flooded.
Are there any lessons to be learned for the participants after such an operation that can improve international co-operation in rescue at sea, if taken seriously? There is a lot that can be done but first of all we have to recognise and agree on the problems to be faced.
- We must recognise that such operations include military and civilian authorities in the decision process
- There is an economic and a political side that must be sorted out. We have to consider how to handle not having common procedures.
- How do we handle not having a common language?
- Do we have sufficient communication in arctic areas?
- How do we connect military/civil communications?
- How do we handle media? Who is responsible for communicating to the media?
- How do we manage to get the amateur guessers away from the media?
- How do we establish a platform of trust between participating authorities and nations good enough to accept common decisions?
I don't say we lack everything mentioned above, but we must think it through - it is too late when the situation is upon us. To save time decisions must be taken and adhered to by those who support the authorities, military as well as civil.
Let us hope the Kursk accident has shown all participants the need for co-operation in saving our sailors' lives.
Vice Adm Einar Skorgen is Norwegian COMNON and led the multinational rescue operation on the Kursk