Non-Subscriber Extract
Air power over Iraq
- Article Tools
| 27 February 2003 |
By Michael Knights
The role of airpower in Operation 'Desert Storm' became a contentious issue as soon as air campaign planning began in August 1990. The conventional wisdom held by most senior US Air Force (USAF) officers at the time placed airpower in a largely supporting role. Key leadership positions in the USAF were held by Tactical Air Command (TAC) fighter pilots who had risen to power in the patronage slipstream of long-standing TAC commanders, generals Wilbur Creech and Robert Russ. This body of senior officers - the so-called 'fighter mafia' - were conditioned by their experiences of both Vietnam and Cold War Europe, where airpower played a supporting role vis-à-vis ground forces.
. . .
Combat identification remains a key unresolved issue, however, causing concerns about non-combatant deaths and friendly fire incidents. On the first count, it is notable that collateral damage levels on 'Allied Force' and 'Enduring Freedom' were relatively high, due in no small part to the targeting strains caused by engaging time-sensitive and time-critical targets. In 'Allied Force', around 500 civilians were killed (around 1 per 46 munitions dropped), and in 'Enduring Freedom' up to 1,300 civilian deaths have been corroborated (1 death per 12 munitions). The unpalatable truth is that at least as many civilians as Al-Qaeda operatives may have been killed by Western air strikes. Friendly fire incidents have been less widespread, partly reflecting the new concept of operations for CAS developed in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
Planning for Iraq
Like 'Desert Storm', a future offensive air campaign in Iraq will represent a compromise between advocates of 'inside-out' theories of strategic attack, and the last generation of the Vietnam-era 'fighter mafia'. The upper echelons of the current operational chain of command and air campaign planning community represent an operationally conservative group. Following the 'Serial 1' targeting directive of 6 October 2001, the US national command authorities (NCA) have designated many of the target sets struck in 1991 as sensitive targets that can only be attacked with NCA permission. These include mosques, electrical power, road transportation, dual-use industry and certain leadership targets.
Pragmatic air support
The next generation of air force leaders - the lieutenant colonels that planned and executed operations in the mid-1990s through to the current crisis - are likely to take a more pragmatic view of airpower, recognising that political and organisational factors make either a pure 'inside-out' or a pure CAS role unlikely, while technology presents growing opportunities for parallel prosecution of both strategic and fielded forces target sets.
In an age where even relatively small numbers of platforms can carry out parallel attacks across a range of target sets, air campaigns are increasingly designed by the limitations on them rather than the positive choice of one target set over another. The key trend in this field, which will dominate the targeting strategy in any future operation in Iraq, remains the developing preference for striking directly at enemy leadership and military forces, while offering sanctuary to civilians and dual-use infrastructure.
493 of 3122 words